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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Neuroscientiﬁc  and psychological  data  suggest  a  close  link between  affordance  and  mirror  systems  in the
brain.  However,  we still  lack  a full understanding  of  both  the  individual  systems  and  their interactions.
Here,  we  propose  that  the  architecture  and  functioning  of  the  two  systems  is  best  understood  in terms  of
two  challenges  faced  by complex  organisms,  namely:  (a)  the  need  to  select  among  multiple  affordances
and  possible  actions  dependent  on context  and high-level  goals  and  (b)  the exploitation  of the  advan-
tages  deriving  from  a hierarchical  organisation  of behaviour  based  on actions  and action-goals.  We  ﬁrst
review  and  analyse  the  psychological  and neuroscientiﬁc  literature  on the  mechanisms  and  processesanonical  neurons
irror  system
sychology
euroscience
europhysiology
organisms  use  to deal  with  these  challenges.  We  then  analyse  existing  computational  models  thereof.
Finally  we  present  the  design  of  a  computational  framework  that  integrates  the  reviewed  knowledge.
The  framework  can  be  used  both  as a theoretical  guidance  to  interpret  empirical  data  and  design  new
experiments,  and  to design  computational  models  addressing  speciﬁc  problems  debated  in the  literature.omputational modelling
ntegration
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. Introduction: affordances, canonical neurons, and
irror  neurons
Studies  on macaque monkeys have shown that brain area F5
putatively homologous to human posterior Inferior Frontal Cortex,
FC, Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998)1 contains two varieties of visuo-
otor neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons (Di Pellegrino
t al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Murata et al., 1997; Raos et al., 1996;
izzolatti et al., 1996; Sakata et al., 1995; for a more recent review
ee Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Both canonical and mirror neu-
ons discharge when macaques execute speciﬁc actions, for exam-
le when they grasp an object with a precision grip or a power grip.
Canonical neurons also ﬁre when the monkey simply observes
n object. This points to a mechanism for detecting object affor-
ances and activating actions on this basis. The concept of
ffordance was ﬁrst introduced by Gibson (1966), who observed
hat the dynamical pattern of the optic ﬂow can be used to guide
avigation reactively through the environment. He used the term
ffordance to refer to the fact that visual perception of the environ-
ent is not just passive perception of objects as such, but direct
erception of the potential actions that the perceiver can carry out
ith them without the need for high-level processes such as rea-
oning about object properties. In the realm of manipulation, for
xample, a person seeing an object would not necessarily only per-
eive colours, shapes and so on, but ﬁrst and foremost also directly
erceive the object’s “graspability”, “liftability” and so on. The affor-
ances of any given object depend not on the object alone, but also
n the embodiment (in particular the actuators) of the perceiving
gent. A bottle, for example, affords grasping for humans but not for
ogs (for which it might afford a biting action) or ants. A key aspect
f the concept of affordance is the reactive nature of the resulting
ensorimotor processing that tends to trigger or prime action in an
utomatic fashion (although we will later see that this tendency
an be strongly modulated by the context and goals of the agent).
1 All brain regions acronyms used in the article are summarised in Table 1 in
ppendix. . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  517
In some of the recent literature, the concept of affordance has
been extended beyond the Gibsonian interpretation to consider
the brain representations of affordances (the possible sensorimo-
tor interactions offered by objects, see for instance Fagg and Arbib,
1998 or Oztop and Arbib, 2002). These representations encode both
the features of the objects needed to act on them (e.g., the size and
location of the object) and the relation between the objects and the
agent’s body (e.g., that an object is within reach or in contact with
a hand).
In cognitive psychology, the concept of affordances has been
further developed with the deﬁnition of micro-affordances (Ellis
and Tucker, 2000; Vainio et al., 2007), also referring to brain rep-
resentations of possible sensorimotor interactions with objects.
Micro-affordances do not concern the whole action but rather spe-
ciﬁc action components: for example, observing an object with a
given size and orientation might activate two  different components
of the grasping action, such as the grip type (e.g., power vs. preci-
sion) and the wrist orientation (e.g., with the hand palm pronated
or supinated).
In  addition to the Gibsonian view, these extensions to the con-
cept of affordance are very important for this review. To avoid
confusion, we will use the term “(micro-)affordance representa-
tions” to refer to the brain representations of affordances unless
the context clearly disambiguates between the Gibsonian and the
brain-related meaning, in which case we will use the simpler term
“affordances”.
Mirror neurons (also found in the parietal cortex (PC); Fogassi
et al., 2005) ﬁre when the monkey observes another monkey or
a human being perform a goal-directed action such as, for exam-
ple, grasping an object (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). This points
to a mechanism for action or intention understanding (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005). A crucial difference
with canonical neurons is that mirror neurons do not discharge
to the simple presentation of an object. This evidence has led
many authors to link mirror neurons to the representation of goals
of actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005;
Craighero et al., 2007). For example, Johnson-Frey et al. (2003) have
shown through an fMRI study that the frontal mirror regions of
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umans are preferentially activated by the sight of images show-
ng a hand grasping an object compared to a hand touching it. This
ndicates that mirror neurons tend to encode action goals such as
he terminal state resulting from an action grasp (e.g., a certain
elation between the hand and the object). Fogassi et al. (2005) fur-
her found that some, but not all, mirror neurons in PC of monkeys
re selective to ultimate (high-level) goals that a given action con-
ributes to (e.g., “grasp to eat” vs. “grasp to place”). This indicates
hat the mirror system is sensitive to goals at different levels of
bstraction (which can be represented in the same areas by differ-
nt populations of neurons).
Finally, some compelling evidence that F5 mirror neurons
ncode action goals rather than action movements comes from
miltà et al. (2008) and Rochat et al. (2010). In these studies, mon-
ey motor neurons that activate during grasping (with the hand)
or food were shown to also activate when grasping with pliers (as
ell as during the observation of the performance of such actions).
his remained true when the monkeys used “reverse” pliers that
equired a different movement to grasp an object (opening instead
f closing the hand) and even for the observation of an experi-
enter spearing food with a stick. F5 mirror neurons thus appear
o encode the goal of motor commands (e.g., a grasp) rather than
he speciﬁc motor activation (e.g., close vs. open a hand to grasp)
eeded to achieve such goal.
In contrast to the wealth of data obtained from monkeys, there is
till a relative lack of direct evidence on mirror neurons in humans.
n exception to this is a recent study by Mukamel et al. (2010) who
ecorded single cells in human patients with intractable epilepsy.
hey found a subset of mirror neurons in the frontal (supplemen-
ary motor area, SMA, and pre-SMA) and temporal (hippocampal
egion) lobes that were activated both during the visual observation
nd the execution of grasping actions. Furthermore, other recent
tudies, mainly based on brain imaging techniques such as fMRI,
lso indicate the existence of both canonical and mirror systems
n humans (Chao and Martin, 2000; Buccino et al., 2001; Grèzes
t al., 2003a; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003; Fadiga et al., 2006; Kilner
t al., 2009; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; for a review see Rizzolatti
nd Craighero, 2004). For example, Chao and Martin (2000) have
hown with fMRI that tool naming activates the left ventral premo-
or cortex.
This review aims to contribute to the study of the affordance
nd mirror systems in three ways. A ﬁrst main contribution is the
ntegration of behavioural and neuroscientiﬁc evidence on both
he affordance and the mirror systems. Although both systems
ave been extensively studied with behavioural and neuroscientiﬁc
xperiments as well as with the implementation of computa-
ional models, these different avenues of research remain largely
eparated. For example, the cognitive psychology literature on
ffordances is rarely related to the underlying brain processes and
he same is true for some of the behavioural experiments relevant
or the understanding of mirror neurons. There is thus a certain lack
f an overall integrative picture of the different levels of analysis.
Two  key insights (or principles) will guide our contribution to
ink the psychological, neuroscientiﬁc and computational analy-
es of the affordance and mirror systems. First, organisms face an
mportant cognitive challenge when interacting with their material
nd social environment: the environment continuously offers them
 great number of opportunities for action. Organisms therefore need
o continuously select appropriate affordances and actions based
n the overall context and their high-level goals. Understanding
he way the brain addresses this challenge helps to understand and
xplain many issues related to the neural mechanisms underlying
he affordance system and canonical neurons as well as behavioural
henomena related to affordances investigated in psychology. This
nsight will be used in Section 2.1 to present a unifying account of
he psychological and neuroscientiﬁc evidence on the affordanceioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 493
system.  In particular, we will show how the brain is organised along
two major neural pathways, one encoding affordances and actions
(the dorsal neural pathway) and one, including the prefrontal cor-
tex, involving a number of mechanisms that allow the selection of
affordances and actions on the basis of high-level goals (the ventral
neural pathway).
The  second insight is that behaviour and the underlying brain
mechanisms are organised in function of their goals, represented at
multiple levels of abstraction. This allows organisms to greatly
enhance the ﬂexibility of their behaviour, for example to learn
behaviour in terms of simple motor acts (e.g., reaches or grasps),
to monitor behavioural success, to compose actions to build more
complex behaviours, to recognise actions when executed by others
and so on. We  will show that this organisation can explain many
aspects of individual and social purposeful behaviour, including
several aspects related to their underlying neural mechanisms. To
this effect, we  present an integrated view of the major psychologi-
cal and neuroscientiﬁc experiments involving mirror neurons and
the representation of goals at multiple levels of abstraction in Sec-
tion 2.2. That section analyses in particular the important role that
goals play in behaviour organisation (especially in primates) as well
as the putative brain structures involved in their encoding (e.g., the
prefrontal and parietal cortex) and exploitation (e.g., the premotor
and motor cortex).
The  second main contribution of the paper is the presentation
of an integrated view of the affordance and mirror systems with
a focus on their function and the mechanisms that lead to their
development. Current research in this area remains fragmented,
focussing mainly on either affordance processing and canonical
neurons or action understanding and mirror neurons but not typi-
cally on both.
Here,  we adopt a system-level approach in the analysis of
empirical evidence on the affordance and mirror systems pre-
sented in Section 2. In particular, we follow the idea that canonical
and mirror neurons are neural populations whose function and
development can only be understood in the context of wider
neural systems with which they exchange afferent and efferent
connections and with which they play key adaptive functions
for the organism as a whole. We  therefore identify the larger
integrated systems and contribute to the understanding of their
relations by discussing the interplay between their components.
In this sense, although the paper presents research on affordance
and mirror systems sequentially, the material presented is aimed
at understanding their relationship.
The third main contribution of the paper is a computational frame-
work that integrates the knowledge reviewed in Section 2. This
includes in particular:
• The  principle of multiple affordance selection involving the affor-
dance  system;
• The  principle of the goal-based organisation of behaviour involv-
ing  the mirror system;
• The  functional and neuroscientiﬁc relations between the affor-
dance  and the mirror systems.
To develop the framework, we  ﬁrst review existing computa-
tional models of affordance and/or mirror systems (Section 3). In
doing so, we  show that some system-level models capture the two
insights guiding the reviews presented here (usually only one of
the two) while others capture speciﬁc computational mechanisms
that can be used as building blocks to investigate speciﬁc aspects
of those systems. We  then present a uniﬁed computational frame-
work that draws from the models reviewed in Section 3 to build
an integrated view of the affordance and mirror systems (Section
4). Given the complexity of the resulting framework, this is not
meant to be understood as an actual model since the outcome
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is then followed by relevant neuroscientiﬁc evidence on the under-
lying brain mechanisms and areas. These psychological processes
and brain mechanisms are sketched in Fig. 1. Within the dorsal neu-
ral pathway, the parietal cortex (PC) and the premotor cortex (PMC)94 S. Thill et al. / Neuroscience and Bi
f a complete implementation would be overly complex and not
ocussed on speciﬁc problems and predictions. Rather, the value of
he framework lies in: (a) the theoretical integration of research on
ffordance and mirror systems as well as the formation of a set of
oncepts useful for interpreting them in a coherent fashion and (b)
he provision of guidance for the design of speciﬁc models capable
f tackling speciﬁc problems and producing testable predictions. To
llustrate the utility of the framework, we summarise some of the
ost important open problems of the ﬁeld and give preliminary
ndications on how the framework could be used to investigate
hem in depth by facilitating the construction of speciﬁc models
Section 5).
Given  the breadth of topics addressed and the number of inter-
isciplinary perspectives it contains, the present review is rather
ubstantial. However, if desired, the various sections of the paper
an be read in a modular fashion based on the interests of the reader.
ection 2.1 covers psychological and neuroscientiﬁc research on
ffordance systems with a particular focus on the problem of select-
ng appropriate affordances among all the available ones while
ection 2.2 presents the psychological and neuroscientiﬁc research
n the mirror system, in particular regarding the encoding of
ehaviour in terms of goals. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 can be read indi-
idually if the reader is interested in only one of the two  systems.
ocussing only on the psychological aspects (Sections 2.1.1 and
.2.1) or the neuroscientiﬁc aspects (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2) is
lso possible. However, reading both Sections 2.1 and 2.2 facili-
ates the understanding of the relations between the two  systems.
eaders predominantly interested in existing computational mod-
ls of either system can proceed directly to Section 3 and refer to
ection 2 when needed. Readers mainly interested in the integrated
ramework and a computational view on the relationships between
he affordance and the mirror systems can proceed to Section 4,
eferring to Section 3 only when needed (e.g., to envisage how
he different computational components of the framework might
e implemented in detail). Section 5 discusses open issues of the
eld and how the framework from Section 4 might help address
hese, in particular by designing and implementing speciﬁc com-
utational models. Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions of general
nterest.
. Goal representation and selection among multiple
ffordances: psychological and neurophysiological evidence
Throughout the paper, we distinguish the following key aspects
f actions (see Hamilton and Grafton, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007 for
imilar deﬁnitions):
(a)  High-level goals: these refer to the neural representation
of desired outcomes (e.g., “drinking from a bottle”) that
have  a high rank in the hierarchical organisation of action.
They  are more abstract and closely related to the ulti-
mate/adaptive/homeostatic needs of the agent. These goals
usually  involve long time scales and a sophisticated course of
action  to be accomplished (we prefer this more neutral term to
the  ones used in Hamilton and Grafton, 2007, or Kilner et al.,
2007,  which were “outcome” and “intention” respectively);
b) Goals: these refer to the neural representation of desired out-
comes  (e.g., “reaching for the bottle” or “grasping the bottle”)
that  have a lower rank in the behavioural hierarchy. They are
more  concrete, involve speciﬁc actuators and are not closely
linked  to speciﬁc adaptive functions. This type of goal usually
involves  short time scales and “simple” motor acts such as those
often  referred to with language verbs (e.g., “reach”, “grasp”,
“touch”, “push”, etc.);ioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
(c)  Sensorimotor mappings (or skills): these are formed by the neural
processes  that transform the signals from sensors into those to
be  issued to muscles and thus implement the on-line guidance
of  action execution.
(d) The muscle activity and kinematic level: the activity of muscles
needed  to produce the movements implementing the action
and  the resulting conﬁguration changes in space and time of
the  actuators.
The distinction between the different levels of actions is impor-
tant for the analyses presented in the paper. For example, high-level
goals are a useful concept to explain some aspects of the functioning
of the prefrontal and parietal cortex. Goals are relevant for inter-
preting the functioning of the mirror-neuron system components
(e.g., some areas of premotor cortex and inferior frontal cortex).
Sensorimotor mappings are relevant for interpreting the forma-
tion of affordance representations and the preparation/execution
of actions in premotor/motor cortex.
Although useful, these distinctions should nonetheless be
treated with care as: (a) what a brain area represents can only be
inferred on the basis of the referents (parts of the world, sensors,
actuators, internal body states, etc.) with which its activation corre-
lates; (b) different brain areas often contain different populations
of neurons that represent different things; (c) representations in
the brain are often distributed over multiple areas; (d) representa-
tions in one brain area might cause similar activations in neurons
of areas to which it is connected; (e) there is rarely a consensus in
the literature on what different parts of brain represent (moreover,
different terminologies are sometimes used).
2.1. Affordances and affordance control based on prefrontal
cortex
This  section deals with the ﬁrst principle guiding this review,
namely the brain’s solution to the challenge of selecting appropri-
ate affordances from those elicited by the environment. We ﬁrst
review relevant key psychological experiments and theories. ThisFig. 1. The brain areas and the functions played by them in the implementation
of  the ﬁrst principle of motor brain organisation informing this review. PC, parietal
cortex;  PMC, premotor cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; TC, temporal cortex.
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mplement the sensorimotor mappings that extract affordances
rom the world objects and lead to the selection, preparation, and
xecution of actions. Within the ventral neural pathway, the tem-
oral cortex (TC) detects the identity of objects and other resources
n the world. Based on this, as well as external context and internal
omeostatic drives, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) forms goals. With
hese goals, the PFC guides top-down overt and covert attention
ogether with TC and PC. As we will see, it also biases the selection of
ffordances and actions by exploiting a number of mechanisms act-
ng within the different stages of the dorsal pathway (these biasing
rocesses will be also referred to as “affordance and action control”
hroughout the paper).
The  analysis of affordances presented in this paper comple-
ents the work of Cisek and Kalaska (2010), which shares the
nsight that the sensorimotor system is organised into two  major
athways; one implementing sensorimotor mappings for online
ontrol of actions and one biasing the selection among the available
ffordances and actions. The focus of Cisek and Kalaska (2010) is on
 thorough analysis of the two pathways based on neuroscientiﬁc
nd neurophysiological evidence, showing in particular how the
rain simultaneously speciﬁes actions and selects among them in
ontinuous dynamic interaction with the environment, rather than
mplementing behaviour based on sequentially organised percep-
ual, cognitive, and motor processes. The review presented here,
n the other hand, focuses on the important role that the PFC plays
n biasing the selection of affordances and action based on object
dentiﬁcation and the internal states of the agent. It also provides
n extensive review of behavioural evidence putatively related to
he functioning and interaction of the two pathways and presents
 critical review of the speciﬁc computational mechanisms used in
ast models that can be used to implement the processes related
o the two pathways in future work.
.1.1. Psychological evidence and theories on affordances and
ffordance  control
In  the ﬁrst three subsections of the following, we  present
esearch on the presence of multiple affordances elicited by the
nvironment and the interference problems they may  cause. This
otivates the remaining subsections, which address the mecha-
isms through which we select appropriate affordances among the
any available.
.1.1.1. The environment elicits many affordances. Objects typically
licit multiple affordance representations and the context in which
hese are perceived can modulate their activation (with “context”
e refer to the situation as a whole rather than merely the spe-
iﬁc tasks performed). Tools, for instance, are manipulable objects
hat elicit multiple affordances. They activate not only affordances
elated to grasping (a form of manipulation) but also those related
o their function (Creem-Regehr and Lee, 2005). Bub et al. (2008)
ddressed this characteristic by distinguishing between two kinds
f grasping actions: those used to pick up an object and those asso-
iated with using an object for its intended purpose.2 The authors
howed that either affordance type can be activated to different
egrees in function of the context.
Borghi et al. (2012) recently presented participants with pairs
f objects that could be functionally related, spatially related or not
elated at all (e.g., fork and strawberry; fork and glass; fork and
ennis ball). The objects were presented either by themselves, in
he presence of a hand close to one of the objects or in the pres-
nce of a hand grasping one object (e.g., the fork) with either a
anipulative or functional posture (thus targeting the distinction
2 Bub et al. (2008) refer to the ﬁrst type of grasp as “volumetric” and to the second
ype as “functional”, see also Pellicano et al., 2010).ioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 495
between affordances elicited by shape and function of an object
respectively). Participants were required to respond whether or
not the two objects were typically seen or used together by pressing
corresponding keys on the keyboard. Response times were found to
be modulated by context and hand posture. Manipulative postures
were the slowest in the functional context and functional postures
were inhibited in the spatial context. These results are likely due to
a mismatch between the inferred goal and the context. This interac-
tion was  present only when participants were required to provide
hand rather than foot responses, likely due to the activation of an
effector-speciﬁc motor simulation.
Further evidence on the existence of multiple affordances comes
from the literature on “conﬂict objects” and “non-conﬂict objects”
(Jax and Buxbaum, 2010). “Conﬂict objects” are objects that elicit
contrasting affordances for manipulations associated with the
object structure and for manipulations for the speciﬁc use (func-
tion) of the objects. For example, a calculator affords a manipulative
clench grasping response and a functional poke response. Evi-
dence shows two forms of interference involving conﬂict objects: a
short-term grasp-on-use interference (the structure-related affor-
dance interferes with the use manipulation), and a long-term
use-on-grasp interference (the use affordance interferes with the
structure-related manipulation after the use of the object in pre-
vious experimental blocks). Buxbaum and Kalenine (2010) have
recently proposed that two different circuits underlying differ-
ent affordances might be activated: one based on object structure
(dorso-dorsal stream), and another related to object function
(ventro-dorsal stream; see Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003, for the
distinction of the two routes). Context-dependent multiple affor-
dances are also generated at a more abstract level as demonstrated
for instance by studies that focus on affordances and language com-
prehension. A number of behavioural studies have for instance
shown that different affordances can be activated depending on
linguistic context (see e.g., Borghi, 2004; Glenberg and Robertson,
2000; Zwaan, 2004).
2.1.1.2.  Stable and variable affordances. An important distinction
relevant for affordance representation and selection is the one
between stable and variable affordances (Borghi and Riggio, 2009,
which can be understood as micro-affordances3 (Ellis and Tucker,
2000; Vainio et al., 2007, see introduction). In particular, these con-
cepts take the view that each affordance is composed of a number of
speciﬁc aspects. Stable affordances thus relate to features of objects
that tend to be constant across different experiences and contexts
(e.g., the size and shape of “apples” tend to be constant) while vari-
able affordances relate to features of objects that can vary between
different experiences (such as the location of apples).
The distinction between stable and variable affordances is
related to the distinction between the ventral and dorsal neural
pathways (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982) as well as the distinc-
tion between the dorso-dorsal and ventro-dorsal routes forming
the dorsal neural pathway (Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003). In this
regard, the representation of some variable affordances (such as
those dependent on location) might mainly involve the dorso-
dorsal route (together with the neural route controlling the eyes, as
they carry information relevant to guide reaching and gaze control
movements). Conversely, stable affordances (such as those given by
size and shape) might mainly involve the ventro-dorsal route and
the ventral pathway as they carry information relevant for guid-
ing grasping and for recognising the nature of objects relevant to
the formation of high-level goals within PFC. A meta-analysis of
brain imaging studies relevant for stable and variable affordances
3 Note that Borghi and Riggio (2009) still refer to stable and variable affordances
simply  as affordances rather than micro-affordances.
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upports this hypothesis as it shows the presence of partially segre-
ated activation clusters for stable and variable affordances within
he ventro-dorsal (inferior parietal, BA40) and dorso-dorsal (supe-
ior parietal, BA7) pathway respectively (Sakreida et al., submitted).
t should be kept in mind, however, that the representations of
he two types of micro-affordances may  partially overlap as indi-
ated by studies demonstrating that object position affects grasping
nd object size affects reaching (Gentilucci et al., 1991; Corradini
t al., 1992; Chiefﬁ and Gentilucci, 1993; Milner and Goodale, 1995).
urther empirical investigations are needed to clarify this point.
As  recently argued by Binkofski and Buxbaum (2012), the dis-
inction between stable and variable affordances is related to that
etween functional and manipulative affordances, and between the
use” and “grasp” system. In our view, the relation relies upon the
act that both functional and stable affordances are processed in
he ventro-dorsal stream since they are the product of a longer and
ore consolidated experience. Indeed, the object’s function likely
epends on the frequency of the types of action that can be per-
ormed with it. Similarly, stable affordances pertain to long-term
erception-action patterns stored in memory rather than online
esponses to the current environment. In contrast, manipulative
nd variable affordances are more sensitive to the current context
nd are more closely related to the execution of online-controlled
ctions and hence are mainly processed in the dorso-dorsal stream.
.1.1.3. The problem of interference. The existence of multiple affor-
ances and affordance components raises the problem of how
hey can be selected and used to produce coherent non-interfering
ctions. Behavioural experiments based on the “compatibility
ffect” paradigm turn out to be highly relevant for this issue. These
xperiments were originally proposed to show that even highly
ognitive tasks (such as categorisation) and the underlying brain
epresentations are strongly inﬂuenced by embodied aspects of
ehaviour (e.g., the affordances directly elicited by the objects).
owever, they also shed light on the mechanisms related to the
election among multiple affordances because they are based on
xperimental set-ups that concurrently elicit two or three affor-
ances and study how they interact. In a typical experiment,
articipants might be instructed to perform a task in relation to
n object by using an action that is either similar to or different
rom (i.e., is compatible or incompatible with) the action the object
ffords directly and most strongly. For example, Tucker and Ellis
2001) had participants perform a precision or power grip on a
ustomised joystick in order to classify a target object as either
natural” or “artefact” (see Grèzes et al., 2003b, for a brain imag-
ng study of the cortical regions mainly involved in performing the
asks in this experiment). The objects presented were either small
r large, hence tended to afford a precision grip or a power grip
espectively. The results show that even though the size of a given
bject is not relevant to accomplishing the categorisation task, the
ompatible/incompatible affordance it elicits facilitates/interferes
ith the selection of the task action. This illustrates that the many
ffordances elicited by the seen object and the touched joystick
ompete for triggering the related actions, requiring suitable selec-
ion mechanisms based on context and the high-level goals of the
articipants. In this case, these are represented by the experimen-
al context and the task to be accomplished (as required by the
xperimenter).
.1.1.4. Affordance selection and action modulation relies upon high-
evel goals. A growing body of recent studies suggests a strong
nvolvement of high-level goals (formed on the basis of context
nd current motivational and emotional states) in the selection of
ffordances. These studies show that the kinematics of reach and
rasp actions are modulated by the presence of other persons in the
xperimental setting (for an overview see Becchio et al., 2010). Forioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
example, Becchio et al. (2008) found that the kinematics of reach-
ing, grasping and placing actions differed between moving an object
from one location to another and passing an object to a partner
(social intention condition).
Similarly,  Ferri et al. (2010, 2011) investigated the kinematics
of action execution in feeding behaviours. Ferri et al. (2011) found
that a “social affordance” is activated when reaching, grasping, and
placing a piece of food into the mouth of another person, leading to
increased movement accuracy. This modulation of movement kine-
matics occurs even when the ﬁnal aim of the task is not to feed but
the other person simply opens the mouth, thus activating a social
request. No modulation is observed when a non-human mouth-like
aperture is presented. Ferri et al. (2010) showed that the kinematics
of interacting with a piece of food in a way  that simulates feeding
a person are modulated by the facial expression of the recipient:
the movement accuracy in particular is higher when participants
simulated feeding a happy face compared to a disgusted, neutral,
or sad face. Overall, these experiments show the level of sophisti-
cation of the processes leading to the formation of high-level goals
and how these have an important impact on affordance selection
and action execution.
2.1.1.5.  Selection of affordances based on attentional processes.
Another possible way in which high-level goals can inﬂuence affor-
dance elicitation and action execution is through spatial (often
overt) attention. Relevant to this is the “Simon Effect” (Simon,
1990; Kornblum et al., 1999; Hommel, 2010), namely the ﬁnd-
ing that reaction times tend to be faster when the stimulus is
located in a location (e.g., left vs. right) congruent with the response
requested by the experiment (e.g., pressing a left vs. a right button).
This implies that reacting towards the location of the stimulation
(Simon, 1969) is facilitated, likely because the allocation of atten-
tion to that location tends to activate a corresponding value for
the spatial components of the affordance. Note that the converse
also appears to be true as some studies have shown that object
affordances attract attention. For example Handy et al. (2003)
demonstrated with ERP and fMRI that graspable objects (tools)
automatically direct visual attention towards their location (albeit
only in the right hemiﬁeld).
Tucker  and Ellis (1998) provide important evidence on the role
that attention plays in the deﬁnition of the spatial components
of affordances. They devised a compatibility effect experiment in
which the participants had to classify objects as appearing upright
or reversed by pressing different keys on the keyboard (left, right).
Response times were faster in case of congruency between the
handle location (left, right) and the key to press. This might sug-
gest that the affordance related to the handle was  elicited (even
though the handle was irrelevant to the task) and its spatial param-
eters (the spatial location of the handle) inﬂuenced the execution of
the task action (pressing of the button). Elaborating on this study,
Symes et al. (2005) investigated the role played by the affordance
effect and the Simon effect, manipulating both the orientation of
objects (e.g., the handle could be on the left or. on the right side
of the object) and their location (e.g., they could be located either
in the left or in the right visual ﬁeld). With limited attentional
involvement (i.e., when participants were simply asked to cate-
gorise object’s colour) only the Simon effect was  present. However,
when the attentional scan was deep and required representing
the object (i.e., when participants had to determine whether the
objects were kitchen or garage objects) both an affordance effect
and the Simon effect were found (both with manual and foot
responses).Riggio et al. (2008) ran an experiment to further clarify the
relation between attention and affordance activation. They used a
modiﬁed version of Tucker and Ellis’ (1998) paradigm in which the
target stimulus could correspond or not correspond to a dynamic
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to the object (so that they could easily reach for it) or when theyS. Thill et al. / Neuroscience and Bio
vent capturing attention. As in Tucker and Ellis (1998), partici-
ants responded by pressing a different key in function of whether
he object they saw was  upright or reversed. The authors decoupled
ttentional effects from affordance effects: the location of the tar-
et was coincident or not with the location to which attention was
utomatically directed through the sudden disappearance of the
bject. Results showed that the affordance effect always occurred
elative to the target object irrespective of the event, whereas the
imon effect occurred relative to the event capturing attention (i.e.,
he object disappearance). These ﬁndings suggest that automatic
nd controlled processes of visual attention may  play a differential
ole in the occurrence of the two effects. In particular, the Simon
ffect related to the location parameters of actions depends more
eavily on the automatic capture of attention. Affordance effects
elated to manipulation appear to rely more on controlled atten-
ional processes.
Further behavioural experiments have shed light on the mech-
nisms underlying the relationship between affordance and action
licitation on one side and the depth of the attentional scan on
he other. Tipper et al. (2006) performed experiments to show
hat affordances are not automatically elicited but are strongly
odulated by the task and the related attentional processes (see
lso Pellicano et al., 2010). They show that compatibility effects
etween the object’s handle orientation and the key to be pressed
o respond are present when participants engage in a shape dis-
rimination task but not in a colour discrimination task. In addition,
hey investigate the effect of the “functional state” of the object
timuli. The authors show that in the shape discrimination task
but not in the colour discrimination task), objects in an active
tate (when it is used in line with its function, such as a pressed
oor handle), and in a “passive state” otherwise (e.g., a horizon-
al door handle) produce larger compatibility effects compared to
bjects in a passive state. The experiments show that the inter-
erence of non-relevant affordances is present (or stronger) if the
ask to be accomplished requires a deep attentive investigation of
bject features (e.g., shape) that are more strongly related to those
ffordances, possibly based on the underlying mechanisms of neu-
al activation enhancement (see next section). These results imply
hat the various aspects of affordance representations are activated
nly if the attentional processing of the object features related to
hem is sufﬁciently deep.
Some experimental studies have focused on the interplay
etween the affordance and mirror systems, possibly mediated by
ttention (e.g., Borghi et al., 2005, 2007; Fischer et al., 2008; Vainio
t al., 2008; Yoon and Humphreys, 2005). Borghi et al. (2005, 2007)
nd Vainio et al. (2008) used a priming paradigm in which hands
ith a power or a precision grip posture preceded the presenta-
ion of large or small objects. They found a compatibility effect
etween the hand posture and the object size even if the task simply
equired a categorisation of objects into natural objects and arte-
acts. Two different mechanisms may  have been operating in the
xperiment: a mirror mechanism triggered by the presented hand
nd a canonical neuron mechanism triggered by the affordance of
he presented object. Similarly, Fischer et al. (2008) demonstrated
hat static images of different hand grip postures (precision vs.
ower) induced an attention shift towards the grasp congruent
bject within 350 ms.  Ellis et al. (2011) instructed participants to
lassify objects (using left/right key press responses) without tak-
ng into account the reaching actions towards the objects shown
n a video clip. Participants’ performance was  nonetheless inﬂu-
nced by the observed reaching action: during the observation of a
each, it was easier to perform a response with the hand opposed
o it. This reﬂects the interplay of canonical and mirror mecha-
isms and suggests that a mirror mechanism triggered not only by
imilar actions but also by complementary actions might be active
Newman-Norlund et al., 2007).ioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 497
2.1.1.6.  Selection of affordances based on inhibitory mechanisms.
Inhibitory mechanisms also play an important role in the selection
of affordances and actions. To investigate this issue, researchers
have probed the mechanisms that allow the suppression of affor-
dances elicited by distractors while participants are engaged in
accomplishing a certain motor task. In the seminal work of Tipper
et al. (1992), participants had to reach a target in the presence
of distractors located in various positions relative to the target.
Results showed that distractors eliciting responses located within
the path of the target response caused substantial competition
with the task action while the others did not. More importantly,
when the hand passed over (or past) a distractor on its way to
the target, the responses evoked by the distractor were actively
inhibited.
In another study, Ellis et al. (2007a) investigated the effects
of distractor affordances using a compatibility paradigm that
extended the basic experiment of Tucker and Ellis (2001) reviewed
earlier by adding a distractor next to the target. This distractor sug-
gested a type of grasp that was either compatible or incompatible
with the requested task response. The presence of the distractor
caused a reversed compatibility effect: reaction times were faster
in the case of distractor affordances incompatible with the task
responses, and slower with compatible ones. The authors suggest
that the explanation of this result is likely the presence of inhibitory
mechanisms that suppress the affordance elicited by the distrac-
tors. In doing so, these mechanisms interfere with the execution
of the task actions if these share common features (e.g., type of
requested grasp) with the suppressed affordances (see also Section
3.1 for a review of a model by Caligiore et al. (2013), implementing
this process).
The  importance of inhibitory mechanisms for affordance
selection is also highlighted by the experiments of Eimer and
Schlaghecken (1998); (see Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2002, for a
review). In these experiments, participants had to press a button
indicated by an arrow cue. The cue was preceded by a masked
prime formed by another arrow compatible or incompatible with
the main cue. The results indicated that the prime is automatically
inhibited, resulting in a negative compatibility effect (faster reac-
tion times in the case of incompatible vs. compatible primes). This
effect is explained in terms of an active inhibition of the response
automatically elicited by the prime as this interferes with the exe-
cution of actions sharing spatial features with the prime. Aron
et al. (2003) show in an fMRI study that the inhibitory mechanism
involved in these experiments encompasses the inhibitory action of
basal ganglia (BG), namely of the striato-pallido-thalamic pathway
involving them (see Section 2.1.2).
2.1.1.7. Selection of affordances and actions depending on social con-
text. There is also evidence that high-level goals related to the social
context might inﬂuence the selection of affordances and actions.
For example, a variety of studies on language processing paradigms
have recently shown that social context inﬂuences the execution of
actions associated to the detected affordances. Gianelli et al. (2011)
have shown that the simple presence of another agent inﬂuences
kinematics of reaching-to-grasp an object; particularly so when
the other is interacting with the participant. Similarly, Gianelli
et al. (2013) have shown that the social relationship with the other
person (friend or not) modulates the kinematics of reaching and
grasping an object. Participants tend to move fast in the presence
of unknown persons, as if to compete for grasping objects. When
friends are present, movements are faster only when they sit closespeak, particularly so when they use the ﬁrst person pronoun (“I
grasp”) even if no action on their side follows. These studies sug-
gest that the performance of actions afforded by a given object is
affected by the social context.
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.1.2. Biological perspective and evidence on the affordance and
he  affordance control systems
This  section reviews neuroscientiﬁc work on the brain mecha-
isms underlying the behaviours reviewed in the previous section.
hese mechanisms (Fig. 1), allow the brain to process multiple
ffordances in parallel and to exploit the top-down biasing effect
f PFC (informed on context and the agent’s goals) to select them
long the sensorimotor pathways that map  sensations to muscle
ommands.
.1.2.1. The dorsal neural pathway implements sensorimotor map-
ings. Affordance representations are partially based on the
rocessing of object features. Various areas of PC have neurons
ctivated by elements relevant for encoding affordances – such
s the shape of objects, their position, and the object-hand spa-
ial relations (Murata et al., 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1998). These
epresentations can trigger and guide (via a parieto-frontal neural-
athway) action preparation and execution (e.g., for reaching and
rasping) taking place within frontal areas and involving mirror and
anonical neurons (Matelli et al., 1994). The parieto-frontal connec-
ions originate from the primary visual cortical areas (VC) and form
he visual dorsal neural pathway of the brain. This pathway is widely
elieved to extract “where” information from scenes (i.e., the loca-
ion of objects, Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982), or – more generally
 “how” information: all information about objects needed to guide
he on-line execution of actions (Milner and Goodale, 1995, 2008).
It has been shown that the dorsal neural pathway is organised
n partially segregated parallel routes (Gentilucci, 2003; Rizzolatti
nd Matelli, 2003). The most important of these are the dorso-dorsal
nd dorso-ventral routes (see the review of Caligiore et al., 2010,
or more details) previously discussed in the context of stable and
ariable affordances. The ﬁrst route controls the proximal arm and
s mainly involved in executing reaching movements. In monkeys,
his route involves, among others, the medial intra-parietal cortex
MIP; parietal reach region, PRR, in humans) and the dorsolateral
remotor cortex (F2/F4; PMCdl in humans). The dorso-ventral route
ontrols the distal arm (wrist, hand) and is mainly involved in exe-
uting grasping movements. In monkeys, this route involves the
nterior intra-parietal cortex (AIP; named the same in humans) and
he inferior premotor cortex (F5 in monkeys; IFC in humans). Addi-
ionally, one can consider a third important route, this one playing
 key role in eye movements and involving the lateral intra-parietal
ortex (LIP; parietal eye ﬁeld, PEF, in humans) as well as the frontal
ye ﬁelds (FEF, considered part of the PFC rather than of the PMC;
uster, 2008).
.1.2.2.  The ventral neural pathway processes information for top-
own control of affordances. The ventral neural pathway is another
mportant neural pathway involving, as intermediate stages, the
ssociative visual areas of the occipital and temporal cortex (in par-
icular inferotemporal cortex) and terminating in PFC. This pathway
ncodes “what” information (i.e., information about the classes of
een objects, Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982; Milner and Goodale,
995, 2008). As previously mentioned, encoding multiple affor-
ances (in the dorsal neural pathways) supports ﬂexible behaviour
ut also increases the possibility of executing undesired actions and
ay  lead to potentially dangerous interference problems. The brain
eals with these problems through sophisticated mechanisms piv-
ting on PFC at the top level of the ventral neural pathway (Fuster,
001, 2008; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wallis et al., 2001; Cisek, 2007;
isek and Kalaska, 2010; Caligiore et al., 2010). As detailed further
elow, PFC coordinates sensorimotor processes based on internal
otivations and external context (known from a number of suit-
ble input afferences). PFC also possesses the capacity to process
nformation in ways relevant for its supervisory/executive role and
 complex efferent connectivity suitable to modulate affordanceioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
and  action selection within various stages of the dorsal neural
pathways.
The ventral neural pathway can also inﬂuence the dorsal path-
way through direct connections from stages upstream of PFC. The
information on objects encoded in the inferior temporal cortex (ITC)
in particular might inﬂuence the formation of affordances in AIP.
Jeannerod et al. (1994), for instance, reported of a patient with
parietal damage within the dorsal pathway who exhibited an exag-
gerated ﬁnger opening when grasping uncommon objects while
remaining more accurate when grasping usual objects of the same
size. The patient also had an intact capacity of mimicking the size of
known objects with the hands. This suggests that the ventral path-
way, encoding semantic knowledge on objects, could communicate
some information on objects, such as size, to the dorsal pathway.
See Goodale (2008) for a review on the interaction between the two
pathways.
2.1.2.3. PFC as the main locus of high-level goal elaboration. On the
input side, PFC is a top associative/integrative cortex that receives
input from various sensory brain areas, typically associative them-
selves, such as the visual associative cortex (PC and ITC) and the
auditory associative cortex (superior temporal cortex – STC).  These
inputs mainly reach the dorsolateral portions of PFC (PFCdl; Fuster,
2008). Based on them, PFC is able to integrate information from
various sensory modalities and form a representation of the whole
“context” related to the outer world. Moreover, PFC is also informed
on the internal visceral body states and homeostatic drives as it
receives both direct and indirect afferent connections from limbic
areas such as amygdala (Amg), hippocampus (Hip), and hypothal-
amus (Hyp). These connections mainly reach the orbital portions
of PFC (PFCo). PFC is able to attribute values and desirability to
different objects and contexts using these connections carrying
information on internal body states, drives, and the ultimate needs
of the organism (Fuster, 2008). PFC can form high-level goals
to guide behaviour by merging the two  types of information, as
explained in the following.
PFC  has a number of properties allowing it to perform its super-
visory/executive functions. First, PFC is able to form combinatorial
representations of the inputs it receives (as discussed in the context
and motivations above as well as from its position at the apex of
multiple sensory modalities). It can then form complex “rules” (i.e.,
representations of complex multimodal and temporal compounds)
to guide behaviour (e.g., “to perform a grasp action when a green
object is at the right position and to perform a push action when it
is at the left position”; Wallis et al., 2001; see Deco and Rolls, 2003,
for a computational model).
Second,  PFC has a high degree of plasticity thanks to its recipro-
cal connections with Hip and its rapid learning processes (Rolls and
Treves, 1998). These allow storing memories, spanning minutes to
hours, which are needed to formulate plans and to monitor their
execution.
Third, its re-entrant features allow it to implement working
memory functions based on dynamical reverberant circuits (Deco
and Rolls, 2003; see O’Reilly and Frank, 2006, for a model). This
allows PFC to encode not only the current context but also recent
events, supporting decisions based on present and recent past per-
ceptions.
Fourth, PFC is prospective, that is, it is capable of anticipating
future events (Fuster, 2008). Speciﬁcally, PFC, working in synergy
with the cerebellum for fast temporal scales (Middleton and Strick,
2000; Ito, 2008), might possess the capacity to anticipate future
events based on “forward models” (Wolpert et al., 1995; Haruno
et al., 2001; Miall, 2003). Since goals are desired anticipated states,
the capacity of PFC to project into the future is an important pre-
requisite for their formation. All these processes and pieces of
information allow PFC to know “what is needed” (based on internal
behav
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ontext and homoeostatic drives) and “what might be possible”
e.g., there is a particular resource and context in the environment
hat could potentially satisfy a particular need) in terms of action.
ith this basis, PFC can select among the multiple available affor-
ances, as these indicate to the organism which actions can be
ccomplished with success. PFC performs the actual selection of
ffordances and actions via its connections to various stages of the
orsal neural pathway (see Fig. 1) and based on neural mechanisms
rieﬂy reviewed in the following. All these mechanisms are closely
inked to the behavioural phenomena that we have reviewed in the
revious sections.
.1.2.4.  Mechanisms through which PFC exerts a top-down bias on
he selection of affordances and actions. A ﬁrst important efferent
onnection of PFC is formed by the output of the FEF towards
he sub-cortical motor centres controlling eye movements (Fuster,
008). FEF, as mentioned above, can be considered part of the dor-
al stream contributing to control of eye movements together with
ub-cortical pathways involving BG and the superior colliculus (SC).
EF plays a key role in the control of overt attention, in particu-
ar top-down/voluntary attention based on the overall goals of the
rganism (Hikosaka et al., 1998). Sub-cortical pathways play a more
mportant role in bottom-up attention. Overt attention allows the
ocus on different objects and parts of the environment to elicit only
elevant affordances related to objects.
A second important efferent connection of PFC is directed
owards PC (Fogassi et al., 2005; Murata et al., 2000; Rizzolatti and
raighero, 2004). This affects both covert attention and represen-
ations of affordances in PC. Regarding the ﬁrst, PFC connections to
C play a key role in covert spatial attention (Colby and Goldberg,
999; Knudsen, 2007). For example, they contribute to aug-
enting the neural sensitivity related the speciﬁc features of
bjects (Carrasco et al., 2000). These processes also inﬂuence overt
ttention as they modulate PC representations of the dorsal parieto-
rontal neural stream, which controls eye moments (mentioned
bove).
Regarding the modulation of affordance representations, top-
own control can, for example, contribute to updating the
epresentations of objects and contexts suitable for controlling
ovements so as to best pursue the agent’s high-level goals
Fogassi et al., 2005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2007; see also Section
.2 on this). Note that PFC might also bias the processes in high-
evel visual stages of the ventral pathway carrying information to
FC itself, for example via reciprocal connections (Fuster, 2008) at
he level of ITC (Chelazzi et al., 1993).
A ﬁnal important efferent connection of PFC is at the level of
he later stages of the dorsal neural pathways – in particular PMC
 mainly reached indirectly via the supplementary motor cortex
SMC – Rizzolatti et al., 1998; Lu et al., 1994). These connections
ave been shown to strongly affect motor preparation and control
ithin SMC/PMC (Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010; Cisek and Kalaska,
002), in particular in tasks where sequences of movements are
nvolved (Hikosaka et al., 1998). SMC  has also been shown to be
ctive when humans passively observe graspable objects without
nteracting with them (Grèzes and Decety, 2002). This activation
ight reﬂect the fact that, in this case, the affordances elicited
y the objects have to actively be suppressed to prevent unde-
ired actions from being triggered (Nachev et al., 2008; Sumner
nd Husain, 2008). This inhibition might rely upon the inhibitory
ircuits of BG with which SMC  forms important cortico-striato-
halamo-cortical loops. Top-down bias from PFC also contributes
o controlling the selection and timing of the performed actions
nd has been shown to be sensitive to rewards (Padoa-Schioppa
t al., 2004).
The  literature is starting to converge on a consensus on the
peciﬁc mechanisms through which PFC exploits such inhibitoryioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 499
connections  to bias the selection of the contents of the target
areas. In this respect, Munakata et al. (2011) propose that PFC
“inhibitory” control is implemented through two major mecha-
nisms, one mainly involving cortical target areas and the second
sub-cortical/hippocampal target areas. The ﬁrst mechanism relies
upon the fact that a large part (>99%) of long-range cortico-cortical
connections are mediated by excitatory pyramidal cell effer-
ents (Tamamaki and Tomioka, 2010) and most cortical inhibitory
interneurons have rather diffused efferents (Markram et al., 2004).
Since these neurons seem to play an overall regulating function,
the implication is that PFC cannot exert direct inhibition on tar-
get regions nor can it target speciﬁc inhibitory interneurons to
inhibit speciﬁc content. Instead, PFC can exert selected excitation
of speciﬁc content represented in target areas using its contextual,
integrative, multi-modality, goal-directed representations. These
target areas can then inhibit all other content via local inhibitory
connections, thus ensuring their own  selection.
The second mechanism relies upon (excitatory) PFC connections
targeting local inhibitory neurons in sub-cortical/hippocampal
areas.  This inhibitory action usually has a global nature and lowers
the activity of whole areas specialised in the production of cer-
tain types of behaviours (e.g., fear responses) or functions (e.g., the
formation of episodic memories). This is for example the case of
the ventro-medial PFC targeting local inhibitory neurons of fear-
related dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN). Here, the activation of the
ventro-medial PFC in the presence of controllable stress conditions
causes the inhibition of DRN activity, thus avoiding the manifes-
tation of fear responses and favouring the implementation of an
active coping/goal-directed strategy (Maier and Watkins, 2010).
Another example is the possible inhibition of hippocampal regions
by the middle frontal gyrus of PFC resulting in the formation of
weaker memories (Anderson et al., 2004).
We close this section by noting that although the review
focussed on cortical neural pathways, the various regions of the
PC, PMC, M1  and PFC do not work independently of sub-cortical
structures of brain. In fact each of them forms loops with speciﬁc
portions of BG (Alexander et al., 1986; Houk et al., 1995; Middleton
and Strick, 2000; Yin et al., 2006). In this respect, those cortical
areas and corresponding portions of BG form whole integrated sys-
tems (we return to this point in Section 4). These portions of BG
are also interconnected, mainly via striato-nigro-striatal dopami-
nergic connections and thalamic connections (Haber et al., 2000;
McFarland and Haber, 2002), and thus form a hierarchy that starts
in high-level regions (ventral striatum, connected to PFC regions)
and moves to associative (globus pallidum, e.g., connected to PC
and ITC) and sensorimotor regions (putamen, e.g., connected to
PMC  and M1). This aspect of the sensorimotor hierarchy is not
further considered here but constitutes a fundamental means for
high-level goals to inﬂuence behaviour (see also Yin et al., 2006, on
this hierarchy).
2.2. Mirror neurons and the representation of goals
In this section, we  will extend the concept of goal as follows.
A goal state of an action is the state of the sensorimotor body
and/or environment that is produced by the execution of this action
and that leads to learning the action itself (or to its evolution if the
action is innate). Such a state can be either static (e.g., “hand in
touch with the object”) or dynamic (e.g., “walking”). The brain can
have a representation of the goal state of an action, here called
goal representation or simply goal: this is a neural pattern that
correlates with the fact that the goal state actually takes place
in the body/world and is used by the brain to produce adaptive
behaviour.
Note that some authors propose a stronger deﬁnition of goal in
cybernetic terms (Miller et al., 1960; Pezzulo et al., 2006). In this
500 S. Thill et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehav
Fig. 2. The brain areas and their functions in the implementation of the second princi-
ple of motor brain organisation guiding this review. PC, parietal cortex; PFC, prefrontal
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experiment in which participants could acquire bidirectional asso-
ciations between motor patterns (e.g., different key presses) andortex; PMC, premotor cortex; STS, superior temporal sulcus; TC, temporal cortex.
eﬁnition, a goal is the internally represented reference value of
 controlled external variable that can guide action to reduce the
ismatch between the reference and actual values. We  will how-
ver use the “weaker” deﬁnition of goal given above. This allows
s to consider important issues related to the acquisition/origin of
ctions and the adaptive value of goal representations. Speciﬁcally,
he weaker deﬁnition includes the use of goal representations for
urposes other than the triggering of action execution (as in the
ybernetic deﬁnition). For example, they could be used to guide the
earning of the sensorimotor mapping that accomplishes the goal
tate (e.g., a learning signal is produced when this state is achieved),
o monitor whether actions (e.g., produced on the basis of an S-
 reactive behaviour) have achieved their goal state, to evaluate
hether or not to further pursue a goal, or to recognise and pro-
ess goals pursued by other agents. All these aspects are relevant
or the analysis proposed here as they represent ways in which
ognitive systems may  be more sophisticated than simple reactive
ystems.
The second principle guiding this review refers to the idea that
he hierarchically organised representation of actions in the brain
elies upon the representation of their goals. We  have seen that
oals play a key role in the selection of affordances and actions at
arious levels of abstraction. The importance given to goals here
uilds on the idea (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni et al.,
005; Craighero et al., 2007) that mirror neurons represent the
mmediate goals of action (e.g., “bring the hand in touch with the
bject” in a reach action). Fig. 2 sketches key functional aspects of
he principle and the main brain areas involved in its implementa-
ion. Within the dorsal neural pathway, PC and PMC/IFC implement
he mirror system that recognises the effects of observed actions (in
articular within the superior temporal sulcus, STS). On that basis,
he mirror system encodes action goals (in particular within PMC)
nd integrates them with high-level goals (in particular within
C). Within the ventral neural pathway, TC detects the features of
bjects; PFC – informed on objects and internal homeostatic drives
 forms high-level goals and communicates them to the variousioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
stages  of the dorsal neural pathway. Note that this system overlaps
with the affordance system sketched in Fig. 1.
2.2.1. Psychological evidence and theories on the goal and the
mirror  systems
In  the next sub-sections, we ﬁrst review various theories
from cognitive psychology theories supporting the idea that goal
representations are very important for behaviour, focussing on
involved social aspects. We then review the bio-behavioural evi-
dence on goal-directed behaviour. Finally we brieﬂy introduce
recent Bayesian approaches to these topics.
2.2.1.1. Evidence and theories from cognitive psychology: ideomo-
tor principle, event coding theory, internal models theories. Cognitive
psychology has produced various theories and empirical evidence
to support the idea that behaviour has an anticipatory nature and
that motor actions are encoded in terms of goals. One of the ﬁrst
relevant theories is the Ideomotor Principle (IP; Greenwald, 1970;
see Pezzulo et al., 2006; Pezzulo, 2009, for reviews). According to
this principle, action selection and execution tend to follow the
activation of internal causes – such as representations of goals or
goal-related cognitive processes – rather  than (only) the percep-
tion of external stimuli. In this respect, the key idea of the principle
is the “goal-trigger hypothesis” according to which goal represen-
tations (anticipations of action effects) play a crucial role in action
control (Hommel et al., 2001).
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001) is a devel-
opment of the ideomotor principle integrated with the common
coding theory (Prinz, 1990, 1997) according to which perception
and action have a common representation. TEC aims at provid-
ing a conceptual framework to better understand the relationship
between perception and action planning. The theory does not
refer to early aspects of perception or late aspects of motor pro-
cesses, but to the representations and intermediate processes
linking them. In this respect, it portrays late perception and early
action planning as intimately related (or even indistinguishable)
and pivoting on event codes. Event codes are distributed repre-
sentations of feature codes linked by binding mechanisms such as
neural synchronisation mechanisms, and other mechanisms such
as those considered to underlie attentional binding (Kahneman and
Treisman, 1984) or action chunking. Event codes encode distal per-
ceived/produced events rather than features related to proximal
sensor or motor activations, which has various advantages. First,
it supports abstraction from sensory and motor details. Second, it
allows the integration of information from multiple sensory modal-
ities, allowing the encoding of aspects such as the affordances of
objects. Third, it allows planning actions affecting several motor
actuators with substantial ﬂexibility. Fourth, it leads to several
possible interactions between seemingly separate aspects of cogni-
tion, such as those studied in experiments on spatial or affordance
compatibility effects (see Hommel et al., 2001, for other advan-
tages). Note that, in this proposal, event codes might be organised
hierarchically even if the theory does not specify mechanisms or
processes for doing this. Interestingly, the neuroscientiﬁc evidence
closest to TEC has been found in premotor and parietal cortex mir-
ror neurons (Hommel et al., 2001).
We now consider empirical support for these theories. Kiesel
and Hoffmann (2004) trained participants to execute sequences of
actions and showed that the presentation of different tones asso-
ciated to actions could speed up the execution. This was  seen as
indicating that the encoding of action effects plays an important
role in action execution. Elsner and Hommel (2001) devised ansome events (e.g., differently pitched tones) that followed them.
In a subsequent test – in which tones preceded the actions – the
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earned associations had an effect on reaction times and response
requencies. This was interpreted as evidence that the learned
ction-outcome associations causes automatic response priming
nd that the anticipated activation of the goal representation has
n important role in action control.
Growing evidence based on the same matching principle indi-
ates that we tend to be particularly sensitive to actions that
hare features with self-produced actions (for a review, see Schütz-
osbach and Prinz, 2007). For example, various studies have shown
hat children respond faster to hand primes representing children’s
ands than to adult hands (Liuzza et al., 2012) while people also
espond faster when a hand prime is presented in an egocentric
ather than in an allocentric perspective (Bruzzo et al., 2008). Fur-
her, different results are obtained in a line bisection task depending
n whether participants observe human or robotic hands (Ranzini
t al., 2011). All these results can be interpreted in terms of the facil-
tating effect of primes on the triggering of actions via the activation
f the outcomes’ representation (“goals” during action recall) of the
ame actions. Indeed, the ideomotor principle implies that a prime
ore similar to an action outcome than another cue activates the
nternal representation of the outcome faster and thus facilitates
he triggering of the corresponding action.
Wolpert et al. (2003; see also Wolpert et al., 1995; Haruno et al.,
001) have also made important theoretical contributions to the
nderstanding of the anticipatory nature of behaviour, its relation
o goals and intentions, and the role these play in social interac-
ions. These authors use concepts from control theory to explain
atural behaviour, claiming that the central nervous system (CNS)
xploits a number of forward and inverse models to best control
otor action. The anticipatory forward models in particular allow
he CNS to identify hidden aspects of the world dynamics through
he integration of evidence over time. The forward models with the
owest prediction error during interaction with the environment
re those best attuned to the current context (hidden variables).
oreover, the inverse models associated with those forward mod-
ls are the best candidates for action in the given context. Forward
nd inverse models can play a number of functions, such as enabling
he CNS to deal with neural noise, sensory delays and the non-linear
ynamics of the skeletomuscular system. The CNS can exploit this
omputational machinery to also solve a number of problems posed
y social interactions, such as action recognition, intention under-
tanding, and imitation. This is possible as the forward models can
e applied in the same way as illustrated above to infer hidden vari-
bles related to the observed behaviour of others, for example the
ctions they perform and the intentions they have (Wolpert et al.,
003).
.2.1.2. Evidence and theories related to social interactions. Mech-
nisms matching our own action goals to those of others are not
nly at the basis of action comprehension, but are also crucial in
ocial interaction as they support shared actions and coordination
ith others. Shared action representations may  allow individu-
ls to predict others’ actions and integrate those into their own
ction planning, for instance to collaborate on a given task. In
his context, an interesting novel line of research uses the so-
alled Social Simon task (see also Section 2.1). Here, the classical
aradigm used to investigate the Simon effect is modiﬁed to inves-
igate whether or not shared representation are formed during task
haring (e.g., Hommel et al., 2009; Sebanz et al., 2006; Tsai and
rass, 2007). The successful accomplishment of such tasks might
equire not only the sharing of high-level goals (i.e., the overall
urpose of the task) but also of the goals of the speciﬁc actions
nvolved in them. In this respect, recent evidence on mirror neu-
ons suggests that a matching process is present not only when
e observe actions similar to ours, but also when another person
erforms complementary actions which are part of the our motorioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 501
repertoire  (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007). It has also been demon-
strated that action production systems support the emergence of
others’ action understanding early in development (Cannon et al.,
2011).
Evidence that actions are encoded in terms of goals can also be
found in the literature on imitation. For example, Bekkering et al.
(2000) showed that when children imitate others grasping the ear
on the same or opposite side of the acting hand, they tend to imi-
tate the action goal (i.e., the ear to grasp) rather than the kinematic
aspects of actions (e.g., the hand used to perform the grasping). Rao
et al. (2004) review the progressive development of imitative capa-
bilities from simple to more sophisticated ones and show that these
start with the imitation of facial and body movements, then develop
into the imitation of actions performed on objects and ﬁnally into
the imitation of behaviour based on the inference of the intentions
underlying observed, or even attempted, behaviour.
There is also a rich literature in comparative psychology
addressing the fact that humans (both adults and children) and
to some extent apes can understand the goals of others’ actions to,
for example, better pursue their own  goals or to better collaborate
with others (see Tomasello et al., 2005 for a review). This litera-
ture shows not only that both humans and apes possess important
forms of goal understanding but also that humans have a unique
motivation to share emotions and psychological states as well as to
collaborate, thus increasing their ability to successfully engage in
social interactions.
2.2.1.3. Behavioural evidence and theories on goal-directed
behaviour. Further important evidence that behaviour is not
only reactive but also goal-directed comes from the animal lit-
erature (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Yin et al., 2006; see Daw
et al., 2005, for a review and computational account). The key
experimental paradigm used to study the phenomenon (and to
deﬁne the concept of “goal directed behaviour”) in this literature
is that of devaluation (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; see Mannella
et al., 2010, for a model). In this paradigm, rats are ﬁrst instrumen-
tally trained to associate a lever A to a food A and, in a separate
session, a lever B to a food B. In a third session, the rat is satiated
for one of the two foods; it may  for example, be given free access
to food A. The rat is put in front of both levers for the ﬁrst time
immediately following the third session and the frequencies with
which it presses the two  levers are measured in extinction (i.e.,
without food delivery). The results show that the rat presses the
lever corresponding to the non-devalued food (e.g., lever B) with
a higher frequency. This indicates that the current value assigned
to the two  possible goals (“getting food A” and “getting food B”) is
immediately translated into the selection of one of the two  lever-
pressing habits. Interestingly, subsequent research has shown that
lesions of Amg  or PFC (in particular the rat prelimbic cortex, PL,
homologous to the human dlPFC) impair the devaluation effect.
This indicates that the behaviour is controlled by the value that
the organism assigns to goals (Balleine et al., 2003; Blundell et al.,
2003; Hatﬁeld et al., 1996).
2.2.1.4.  Bayesian approaches. Another useful theory in this context
is the predictive coding framework (Friston, 2003, 2005), which has
been applied directly to the interpretation of mirror neurons (Kilner
et al., 2007) and hence bridges functional/psychological and neu-
roscientiﬁc theories. Here, the mirror neuron system is organised
in a hierarchy of cortical areas. This hierarchy includes in particu-
lar SMS  at the lower level (visual recognition of movement), PC at
the intermediate level, and IFC at the higher level (motor plans and
intentions, i.e., high-level goals in our terms). Information encoded
at each level of the hierarchy is the basis for forming an expecta-
tion of information that should be observed at the level directly
below. For example, observing the higher-level goal “she is giving
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 farewell from far away” would imply an expectation that “arm
aving” should activate the lower level. Higher levels thus rep-
esent the causes (e.g., the intentions) and the lower levels the
ffects (e.g., the observed movements). At each level, expectations
re compared with actual experience to form a mismatch error. The
rror is passed to the higher level, both to train the expectations and
o form the activation at that level.
The theory produces various interesting predictions, namely
hat one should ﬁnd: (a) anatomical bidirectional connectivity
etween the involved brain areas, conﬁrmed by the anatomy of
he real mirror neuron system; (b) anticipatory activation of mir-
or neurons, conﬁrmed for instance by Umiltà et al. (2001) and (c)
ensitivity of PC mirror neurons to context/intentions, observed in
he experiments of Fogassi et al. (2005). The theory’s advantage
ith respect to the psychological theories presented above lies in
ts Bayesian formulation. Using a probabilistic quantitative frame-
ork renders it operational and readily usable to produce detailed
omputational models.
.2.2.  Biological perspective and evidence on the goal and mirror
ystems
This  section reviews neuroscientiﬁc research on brain mecha-
isms underlying the behaviours reviewed in the previous section.
hese mechanisms (Fig. 2) allow the representation of goals at
ultiple levels of abstraction and their exploitation in exerting an
verall control of behaviour.
.2.2.1.  Mirror neurons and goal representation. Canonical neurons
ontribute to the preparation of actions by activating not only dur-
ng action execution but also as a consequence of the perception
f affordances (note, however, that they may  be sensitive to the
ffects of top-down selection from the high-level goals and rewards
eviewed in Section 2.1 even though they may  not represent action
oals). Empirical evidence on mirror neurons, on the other hand, ﬁts
ell with the idea that they represent the goals of actions (Fig. 2).
vidence on the “social aspects” of mirror neurons in particular
hows that they represent goals decoupled from the represen-
ation of action preparation/execution as they activate not only
uring action execution but also when a monkey observes the ﬁnal
and/object state to which an action leads (e.g., a grasp executed by
nother monkey). Accordingly, they are often referred to as repre-
enting “goal-directed actions” or “a successfully terminated action
attern” (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gallese and
etzinger, 2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni et al.,
005).
Additional support that mirror neurons represent goals of
ctions comes from the anatomy of the mirror neuron system itself.
he caudal portion of STS is known to respond to biological move-
ents (Grossman et al., 2000; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Puce
nd Perrett, 2003), for instance of hands and arms. The informa-
ion elaborated by this area is sent to parietal areas 7b and 7a.
peciﬁcally, area 7b receives connections from AIP and STS that
ransmit information about affordances and hand states while area
a receives connections from STS and MIP/VIP and encodes infor-
ation about the spatial relations between the hand and the object
ased on those (Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Rizzolatti and Singaglia,
010). This information is then sent to IFC regions where mirror
eurons are found and can thus support their activation with the
nal states (i.e., goals) of grasping actions involving particular rela-
ions between the target objects and the hand. Visual information
eaching mirror neurons may  thus be relevant in forming a repre-
entation of the body/environment relations representing the goals
f actions.
Other evidence shows that mirror neurons can be anticipatory
which suggests a functional role), as they tend to activate before
he action’s ﬁnal state is observed, or even when it is not seen atioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
all.  For instance, a slow readiness potential is observed in humans
before the actual performance of a movement and the same antici-
patory potential is recorded during action observation (Kilner et al.,
2004). Moreover, Umiltà et al. (2001) showed that mirror neurons
could activate not only when a monkey observes a hand grasping
an object but also when the ﬁrst part of the action is shown and the
ﬁnal part (previously seen by the monkeys) covered with a screen.
This suggests that, in some circumstances, the mirror neuron rep-
resentation of action goals might activate before action execution
or observation.
Experiments by Rizzolatti et al. (1998) offer further indirect evi-
dence that mirror neurons encode action goals. Here, a population
of neurons in F5 was found that contained neither canonical nor
mirror neurons and discharged both when the monkey grasped
an object with the hand and with the mouth. The potential impli-
cations for the evolution of verbal communication from gestural
communication aside (see Section 5), this indicates that neurons
in F5 tend to encode actions in an abstract form, which can be
expected to hold for mirror neurons. Indeed, Umiltà et al. (2008)
and Rochat et al. (2010) found compelling evidence that F5 mir-
ror neurons encode action goals. Monkeys were trained to grasp
pieces of food with both normal pliers and “reverse pliers” that
required opening rather than closing the hand to perform a suc-
cessful grasp. The results showed that some neurons that activated
when grasping for food with the hand also did so when grasping
with both pliers, when observing such actions by the experimenter,
and when observing an experimenter spearing food with a stick.
This evidence strongly supports the idea that mirror neurons actu-
ally encode the goals of actions rather than the movements needed
to perform them.
2.2.2.2.  Mirror neurons and high-level goals. There is empirical evi-
dence to suggest that the mirror system is sensitive to high-level
goals of agents, putatively encoded in PFC. Iacoboni et al. (2005)
devised an fMRI experiment focusing on human IFC in which partic-
ipants were shown a video clip of an action performance (“grasping
a cup”) performed either in a context providing a clue to the long-
term goal of the action (“having a cup of tea”, “cleaning the table”)
or in a neutral one. Results showed that the observation of a grasp-
ing action performed within a context produces greater activity in
the IFC mirror neuron area than the observation of grasping actions
performed in the neutral condition or the observation of only the
context. Based on these results, the authors suggest that the human
mirror neuron system is not simply a mechanism for recognising
actions, but also for encoding high-level goals.
Using fMRI, Cheng et al. (2007) showed that human participants
who observe grasping actions directed at food exhibited a higher
activation of IFC and PC mirror areas when they were hungry than
when they were satiated, indicating that the mirror system is sensi-
tive to the needs and drives of the participants. Moreover, the same
scans showed a higher activation of orbital frontal cortex (OFC) as
well as Amg  and Hyp (known to directly and indirectly interface
the brain with the visceral body), indicating that OFC  might be the
origin of the observed modulation of mirror neurons activity.
Fogassi  et al. (2005) illustrate the key role played by PC in
merging information about goals encoded at different levels of
complexity in their work on parietal mirror neurons. Here, the
activation of a substantial number of those mirror neurons (but
not all) was found to correlate not only with action goals (e.g.,
reach, grasp) but also with the high-level goal of these actions
(e.g., place, eat). In the experiment a monkey had to perform
either a “reach → grasp → transport” or a “reach → grasp → bring-
to-mouth” sequence. Interestingly, the different phases of the
sequence, for example the grasping action, are encoded by different
neurons depending on the high-level goal (i.e., eating vs. placing).
This indicates not only that mirror neurons encode action-goals,
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ut also that the parietal region is a fundamental brain area where
nformation of high-level goals encoded in PFC and information
elated to affordances and action goals are integrated.
Hamilton and Grafton (2007) provide further relevant insights
n the representation of goals at different levels of abstraction
ithin IFC and PC. In these experiments, human subjects were
hown clips of a hand acting on an object (e.g., a box with a sliding
id) in order to obtain one of two different outcomes (“high-level
oals” in our terminology); for example opening or closing the box.
rucially, the outcomes could be achieved with different actions
nvolving different kinematics. For example, the lid could be pushed
ith the index ﬁnger or with a precision grasp. This dissociation
llowed the authors to identify IFC and inferior parietal cortex (IPC)
 in particular their right portions (in right handed participants) –
s the areas that most correlated with the outcome of the action
ather than with its kinematics. The authors thus argue that PC (in
articular IPC where parietal mirror neurons have been found; see
ogassi et al., 2005) has a notable importance in encoding high-
evel goals alongside PFC. PMC  regions, on the other hand, might
e more involved in encoding actions in terms of their kinematic
spects. These results indicate that the ultimate needs and high-
evel goals represented in PFC might actually be translated into
peciﬁc actions via a strong bias exerted on the representations
ncoded by mirror neurons, in particular within PC, and that the
atter plays an important role in representing high-level aspects of
ehaviour (“intentions”, overall needs, etc.).
Further, research on the neural causes of autism spectrum disor-
ers (ASD) can help to clarify the relation between mirror neurons
nd high-level goals. Some theories associate this syndrome with
eﬁcits in mental functions supporting the comprehension of oth-
rs’ intentions (Theory of Mind; ToM) whereas others associate
t with deﬁcits of the mirror system. The ToM account of autism
erives from a symbolic, abstract view of cognition (Leslie, 1987)
nd originates in ﬁndings that children with ASD have speciﬁc dif-
culties with pretend play (Wing et al., 1977) and false belief tasks
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). These difﬁculties are linked with the
nability to represent others’ mental states (Frith et al., 1991) or
o decouple mental states from reality (Leslie, 1987). Note that the
ery nature of “mental states” is still debated as they often refer
o different constructs such as desires, goals, emotions, beliefs, or
erceptions (Frith et al., 1991; Saxe et al., 2004).
In contrast, the “broken mirror-system theory” is associated
ith an embodied approach highlighting the key role of mental
imulation in understanding others (Gallese, 2003). These theories
tress the importance of low-level mechanisms of social behaviours
uch as the recognition of actions and action-goals. Autistic patients
ave no difﬁculties in recognizing basic motor acts (e.g., grasping or
eaching; Hamilton et al., 2007; Fabbri-Destro et al., 2008), indicat-
ng that their basic mirror system remains intact. However, they
ay show limitations in processing action chains forming whole
ehaviours (Fabbri-Destro et al., 2008), especially when the under-
ying actions involve a deep understanding of object function (Zalla
t al., 2010). This in turn leads to a failure to understand other’s
ntentions behind the observed motor acts (Iacoboni and Dapretto,
006). It also causes deﬁcits in imitation tasks (Williams et al.,
004; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). Hamilton (2009) proposed
hat the complementary strengths of these ToM and mirror-neuron
ccounts should be exploited to close the gaps in the understand-
ng of ASD and that computational models might play an important
ole in doing this.
A  recent proposal (Kilner, 2011) strengthens the idea that the
entral pathway in general and the anterior inferior frontal gyrus
IFC) of PFC in particular encode high-level goals and thus bias
reas in which mirror neurons are found. Kilner (2011) claims that
intentions and goals” (where the intention or goal of an action
s understood as an abstract representation of the action for whichioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 503
there  is a one-to-many mapping of the action onto possible imple-
mentations) are represented in PFC areas of the ventral pathway.
The theory also proposes that intentions and goals are organised
hierarchically, from the more anterior IFC (Broadman area BA47)
to the medial (BA45 and BA44) and the more posterior IFC (BA44
and B6 – the latter part of PMC). This is in agreement with the view
that PFC plays a prominent role in the representation of high-level
goals and extends it with the notion that “intentions and goals” are
represented in PFC at multiple levels of abstraction.
We close this section by referring to an issue related to the
high-level control of the mirror system and the role that inhibitory
mechanisms might have in the implementation of such control. In
a physiological study involving monkeys engaged in a gaze control
task, Shepherd et al. (2009) found two sub-populations of mirror
neurons within LIP. Neurons of one population responded both to
the direction of the observed gaze and when the monkey moved the
eyes in that same direction whereas neurons in the second popu-
lation were suppressed during the observation of the social gaze.
The authors suggest that the population of neurons inhibited in the
social conditions might possibly serve to maintain ﬁxation on the
observed face when this is useful. Similarly, Mukamel et al., 2010
(see introduction), found that a sub-population of neurons with
mirror properties in human SMA  and hippocampal areas exhibit
inhibition during action observation. These authors interpret this
inhibition as a possible means to distinguish between the percep-
tual and motor aspects of actions performed by the agent and those
performed by others. These experiments have two implications rel-
evant for the issue of high-level control of mirror neurons. The
ﬁrst is that they illustrate a particular modality with which high-
level goals (e.g., “to continue to ﬁxate the face” or “to follow the
observed gaze”) might modulate the activity of mirror neurons. The
second is that the speciﬁc mechanisms of this modulation likely
involve inhibitory processes. We  will expand on this when review-
ing models of affordances and mirror neurons in the following
sections.
2.3. Interim summary
This  section has presented a review of the psychological and
neuroscientiﬁc literature supporting two general principles of
organisation of brain and behaviour. The ﬁrst is that the brain con-
tinuously accesses a multitude of affordances via multiple dorsal
pathways. It therefore has to have a way to select only those that
produce actions relevant for the agent’s goals as well as to avoid
interferences. This selection is accomplished on the basis of pro-
cesses taking place mainly within the ventral neural pathways, in
particular within PFC, which is informed on the external context
and the internal needs of the agent. PFC exerts this selection on the
basis of a number of top-down mechanisms and processes acting on
various stages of the dorsal neural pathways. The second principle
is that a fundamental component of the representation of actions is
related to their goals and that mirror neurons play a key role in this.
In the review, we highlighted the fundamental advantages in terms
of behavioural ﬂexibility conferred by these goal representations.
Overall, the behavioural and neuroscientiﬁc reviews of the pre-
vious sections have not only highlighted a number of ways in which
relations between affordance and mirror systems can be found, but
they have also made it clear that we still lack a full understanding
of these relations. The next sections aim to develop a framework
that allows studying the two  systems in an integrated fashion (but
also in isolation if desired). We  believe this is an important method-
ological step required to further our understanding of the relations
between these systems using computational models. We  therefore
ﬁrst review existing models of affordance and mirror systems in
the next section. We  focus in particular on identifying the computa-
tional mechanisms that the brain might have evolved to implement
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he two principles mentioned above. Section 4 will then build upon
his knowledge to propose the integrated framework.
. Overview of existing models of affordance and mirror
ystems
This  section presents a review of major computational models
f affordance selection and mirror neuron systems with the aim
f showing how the two principles illustrated in Section 2 can be
mplemented in detailed computational terms. We  ﬁrst review sci-
ntiﬁc models of affordance processing and PFC affordance control,
rieﬂy discussing how they relate to each other. We  then review
echnological models of affordances that could be exploited in the
uture to model the processes that lead to the acquisition of affor-
ance representations in a more detailed way even though they are
ore abstract with respect to biology. Finally, the section reviews
ata-driven models of the mirror neuron system and discusses how
hey relate to affordance models.
.1. Models of affordance processing and control
We classify affordance models as either scientiﬁc or technologi-
al. Scientiﬁc models aim to understand natural phenomena and to
roduce predictions that are testable in new psychological or neu-
oscientiﬁc experiments. For this reason, these models are strongly
nspired and/or constrained by psychological and/or neuroscien-
iﬁc empirical evidence collected in speciﬁc empirical experiments.
echnological affordance models, on the other hand, usually aim to
llow more efﬁcient intelligent machines and robots. They may  be
nspired by experimental evidence but are usually not strongly con-
trained by it. The two approaches have complementary strengths
nd future models might beneﬁt from the integration of the compu-
ational mechanisms they propose. In the following we  ﬁrst review
ome of the main scientiﬁc models of affordances and affordance
ontrol, focussing on those that are most relevant to the issues
eviewed in the previous sections (see Caligiore et al., 2010, for a
ider but less detailed review of models that touch these and other
spects related to affordances).
.1.1.  The FARS model
FARS  (Fagg and Arbib, 1998, see Fig. 3) is a seminal model of
ffordances that has inspired many subsequent models. It was
eveloped to study the control of grasping in non-human pri-
ates and was  constrained by multiple neuroanatomical and
europhysiological ﬁndings (Sakata et al., 1995; Jeannerod et al.,
995; Rizzolatti et al., 1997). The model was also tested within an
mbodied set-up using a 15-DOFs kinematic hand (the model also
ontrolled an arm but this was abstracted).
In FARS, the parietal and somatosensory areas extract the state
f the object and the body and pass this information to AIP to let it
ompute the object-body relation and hence the grasp affordances
licited by the object (e.g., the affordances related to a precision and
 power grip). The affordances are then communicated to F5, which
as the role of selecting one of them with a bias from F2 (encoding
he task) and to transform it into a sequence of movements (e.g.,
ait → grasp → hold → release) aided by timing signals from area
6 and F6. At the same time, the VIP-F4 neural route guides the
eaching movements of the arm. The movements are then executed
ia M1.
FARS also captures some of the mirror neuron properties
eviewed in Section 2. SII features bidirectional connectivity with
5, allowing the system to not only guide action based on proprio-
eption, but also to form expectations about the possible outcomes
f actions to eventually trigger a reprogramming of the grasp in the
ase its execution leads to outcomes different from the expected
nes. FARS also has a VC-ITC-AIP neural pathway (dropped in theioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
MNS models reviewed below), whose function it is to allow the
ventral pathway to provide an approximate “default” affordance
based on coarse aspects of objects, such as size (see the discussion
on the results of Castiello and Jeannerod, 1991, in section 2).
Regarding  the internal computational functioning of the model
components, the initial extraction of the hand and object prop-
erties is carried out using non-neural computations based on 3D
geometrical calculations. Each resulting affordance is represented
in a neural unit in AIP. This activates the initial unit of a chain
of neural units within F5, each representing a movement of the
action sequence. These cells have forward excitatory connections
and backward inhibitory connections that assure a sequenced exe-
cution of the action movements with the support of timing signals
from F6/BG. Units representing distinct affordances or actions
within AIP and F5 are connected by mutual inhibitory connec-
tions that implement (in particular within F5) a neural competition
assuring that only one affordance/action is selected and executed.
Within F5, this selection is facilitated by a top-down bias from F2.
All connection weights within FARS are hardwired.
3.1.2. A dynamic neural ﬁeld approach
Cisek (2007) introduced the affordance competition hypothesis
(see also Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). The model was  proposed to
account for experiments involving monkey areas PMC  and M1.
These experiments show that neurons recorded within those areas
tend to simultaneously implement a double function (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2002): the selection of action parameters (e.g., the direc-
tion of reaching movements) and the selection of a certain action
based on current affordances and PFC top-down control (e.g., the
actual triggering of a reaching movement).
The model is based on a dynamic neural ﬁeld network (Erlhagen
and Schöner, 2002) that integrates affordance and PFC top-down
information, similarly to what has later been done in TRoPICALS
(see next section). The potential affordances compete against each
other under biasing signals supplied by PFC until a single response
is triggered. The PFC processes are not explicitly implemented in
the model, and its connection weights are hand-coded. The model,
although simple, corroborates the idea that the top-down PFC bias
can contribute to the selection among possible affordances based
on a neural competition mechanism.
3.1.3. The TRoPICALS model
TRoPICALS  (Caligiore et al., 2010, Fig. 4) is a computational
model of affordance control designed to account for compatibil-
ity effects studied experimentally in cognitive psychology. It does
this based on an architecture that considers PFC as a key source
of the top-down control of the areas that participate to the selec-
tion of affordances and execution of actions (the ﬁrst principle
of Section 2). Compared to FARS, TRoPICALS is focussed more
on functional aspects and less on neural details. However, it is
a system-level model with a macro-architecture constrained by
known brain anatomy and has been tested within a weakly embod-
ied model (a camera and a simulated robotic hand controlled in
open-loop).
With respect to function and learning, VC performs image edge
extraction, AIP extracts the shape of objects, and VOT categorises
objects using a self-organising map  (SOM; Kohonen, 2003). The
AIP-PMCl and PRR-PMCd routes (i.e., the two  dorsal neural routes
transforming affordances into grasping and reaching actions) are
trained on the basis of a stylised Hebbian-based reinforcement
learning process that allows the system to learn to associate suit-
able actions (PMCl, PMCd) to available affordances (AIP, PRR). PFC
uses a second SOM to form representations that combine the seen
objects (VOT) and the task to be accomplished (STC) to shape the
current high-level goals used to bias action selected within PMC.
PMC integrates affordance information from PC and goal-based
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Fig. 3. High-level overview of the FARS model (reproduced from Fagg and Arbib, 1998 with permission from Elsevier). FARS focuses on the AIP-F5 system within the dorsal
neural pathway, but also considers other areas: (a) parietal areas (cIPS – here called PIP, posterior intraparietal area): for the extraction of object features such as shape, size
and  orientation, and VIP, for the detection of the target location; (b) prefrontal areas (area 46 of PFC): for implementing working memory, e.g., for remembering recently
executed movements; (c) dorsolateral premotor cortex (F2 in monkeys): for the “instruction stimuli” that allow selecting a particular affordance/action among the available
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tnes; (d) basal ganglia (BG) and the supplementary motor cortex (F6): both used for
reas  (M1): for actually controlling the multiple joints of the system; (g) somatosen
roprioception and touch.
nformation from PFC using a dynamic neural ﬁeld (Erlhagen and
chöner, 2002; Cisek, 2007) that selects actions through neural
ompetition (actions are encoded using population codes as desired
ostures hand/arm). A crucial assumption is that the time needed
y this network to achieve an “action-triggering threshold” corre-
ponds to reaction times measured in psychological experiments
n compatibility effects.
ig. 4. Architecture of TRoPICALS (reproduced with permission from Caligiore et al., 2010
ach  box indicate the brain anatomical areas whose functional aspects are reproduced b
ndicates the type of information encoded by each component. The model architecture con
oute for guiding grasping, and the VC-PRR-PMCd route for guiding reaching). In the vent
bstract the PFC-SMC-PMC and PFC-PC-PMC connections. PFC also receives information fr
he  experiment. sequencing; (e) premotor areas (F4): for the control of reaching; (f) primary motor
reas (primary, SI, and secondary, SII, somatosensory areas): for encoding arm/hand
The account of compatibility effects given by TRoPICALS is
based on four general brain organisation principles incorporated
in its architecture: (a) the two-route organisation of the sensor-
imotor brain into the ventral and a dorsal neural pathways; (b)
the guidance of action selection based on PFC “instructions”; (c)
the selection of actions within PMC  based on the competition
between different affordances with bias from PFC; (d) the capability
). Boxes indicate components of the model. The acronyms at the top-left corner of
y the model (see Caligiore et al., 2010 for more details). The label inside each box
tains a ventral pathway (VC-VOT-PFC-PMC) and two dorsal pathways (VC-AIP-PMCl
ral pathway, VOT is relevant for object recognition while the PFC-PMC connections
om the superior temporal cortex (STC) representing the task to be accomplished in
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f language to trigger internal simulations of the referents of
ords (Barsalou et al., 2008; the latter principle, less relevant here,
as introduced to account for compatibility effects involving lan-
uage). The acronym “TRoPICALS” summarises these principles:
wo Route, Prefrontal Instruction, Competition of Affordances, Lan-
uage Simulation. The model reproduces compatibility effects as an
greement or disagreement (compatibility/incompatibility) of top-
own PFC bias with the available affordances of objects produces
low or fast reaction times.
TRoPICALS was recently extended to augment the selection
apabilities of the modelled PFC with inhibitory mechanisms
Caligiore et al., 2013). This was done to account for the experiment
f Ellis et al. (2007b) involving positive and negative compatibil-
ty effects produced by, respectively, target objects and distractors
recall from Section 2.1.1 that the negative effects of the target
xperiment indicate the presence of an active inhibition of the
ffordances elicited by the distractors). The inhibitory effect was
mplemented by creating an inhibitory neural pathway from PFC
o PMC: this pathway abstracts the inhibitory effects that PFC can
xert on motor cortex preparing actions (e.g., PMC) via BG and SMC.
TRoPICALS provides a broad framework to account for several
ypes of affordance related compatibility effects involving grasp-
ng, reaching and language, and is capable of generating novel
estable predictions (see Caligiore et al., 2010), including some pre-
ictions on the possible outcomes of compatibility experiments
ith Parkinson patients (see Caligiore et al., 2011, 2013; the lat-
er predictions are relevant as Parkinson patients have damaged
xcitatory and inhibitory neural circuits linking PFC to PMC  via
MC).
.1.4. Relations between scientiﬁc affordances models
Both FARS and TRoPICALS investigate the cooperation between
he dorsal and ventral pathways to select the most suitable affor-
ance in a given context but differ in an important way. FARS
ocuses on the role of parietal areas in forming affordances, in par-
icular on the role of the AIP-F5 system in selecting an affordance
mong the available ones and in correctly executing the corre-
ponding action-movement sequence. The inﬂuence of PFC on this
rocess – and of the ventral neural pathway in general (e.g., via the
TC-AIP connections) – plays a marginal role in the model.
TRoPICALS, on the other hand, focuses on the role that the top-
own PFC bias exerts on the selection among different affordances
n the basis of the current context and the system high-level goals.
his allows TRoPICALS to investigate the automatic activation of
ffordances and their eventual contrast or agreement with the
ctions that are requested by the task (compatibility effects). In
his respect, FARS and TRoPICALS focus on complementary aspects
f affordances.
Another difference regards the models’ development: while
ARS is not trained at all, important connection weights of TRoP-
CALS are trained with biologically inspired learning rules. FARS
nd TRoPICALS are similar in the mechanisms used to select affor-
ances, both based on a neural competition. TRoPICALS in particular
ses a dynamic neural ﬁeld to simulate affordance competition
echanisms within PMC: this has been shown to be a plausible
odel of the neural processes supporting affordance and action
election actually taking place within the premotor/motor cortex
Cisek, 2007).
.2.  Technological models of affordances
Technological affordance models are numerous and often focus
n machine learning/engineering issues (rather than studying brain
r behaviour), rendering a detailed review neither viable nor nec-
ssary within the scope of the present paper. However, the fact
hat these models are typically implemented in (simulated orioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
real)  robots implies that they may  contain useful computational
techniques that authors of scientiﬁc models may  ﬁnd useful. We
therefore focus on these aspects here.
Several studies in the ﬁeld of robotics have investigated the
problem of learning affordances and their subsequent use in tack-
ling different tasks. For instance, the biologically inspired behaviour
selection mechanism proposed by Cos-Aguilera et al. (2004) uses
clustering and self-organising feature maps to relate object invari-
ants to the success or failure of an action. In the work of Fitzpatrick
et al. (2003), a robot learned the direction of motion of different
objects when poked and used this information at a later stage
to recognise actions performed by others. Both approaches learn
speciﬁc types of affordances using relevant information directly
extracted from sensory inputs. Fritz et al. (2006) propose a more
sophisticated solution in which the learning procedure also selects
the appropriate features from a set of so-called visual Scale Invari-
ant Feature Transform (SIFT) descriptors. Stoytchev (2005) puts
a stronger emphasis on action and focuses on the importance of
sequences of actions and invariant perceptions to discover affor-
dances in a behavioural framework.
More recently, Dogar et al. (2007) presented a goal-oriented
affordance-based control for mobile robots based on the formal-
ism suggested by Sahin et al. (2007). Here, previously learned
behaviours (such as “traverse” or “approach”) are combined to
achieve goal-oriented navigation. The model proposed by Akgun
et al. (2009) uses self-organising maps and support vector machines
to learn a mapping between relevant features and effect cate-
gories in an affordances learning task. Böhme and Heinke (2009)
propose a model in which the attention focus depends on the
affordances and contact points suitable for grasping of the objects.
Finally, Montesano et al. (2008) have proposed a model which
uses a Bayesian network within an imitation learning framework,
to efﬁciently deal with uncertainty, redundancy, and irrelevant
information in training a humanoid robot to interact with objects
according to suggested affordances.
The above models are all excellent examples of how to design
a robotic platform capable of extracting relevant information from
sensory inputs in order to learn object affordances. Furthermore,
some of these models are inspired by the behaviour of real orga-
nisms. However, they do not typically take into account detailed
neurophysiological or psychological evidence regarding the mech-
anisms underlying affordance processing. It is therefore of interest
to discuss an approach which is guided by such evidence more
closely.
Sahin and Erdogan (2009) start from the affordance formali-
sation proposed by Sahin et al. (2007) and develop an affordance
model that incorporates mirror and canonical neurons from a func-
tional perspective. In their model, affordance relations can be seen
as relations that connect three neural ﬁelds encoding: (a) the object
(along different features such as size and shape), (b) the behaviour
as a motor chain that connects to motor areas, and (c) the effect.
A goal signal can prime the effect desired in a certain context.
The motor chain representation needs both exteroceptive feedback
(such as visual observation of hand-object relation) and proprio-
ceptive (e.g., motor) feedback to execute the behaviour in a closed
loop manner. Crucially, a second parallel ﬁeld of motor chains can be
trained to imitate the ﬁrst motor chain layer. After training, the sec-
ond motor chain layer can provide predictive sensory feedback to
the ﬁrst motor chain layer which would allow it to execute faster.
The parallel motor chains can also be used to activate the effect
layer to indicate the intention of the agent being observed.
The  model of Sahin and Erdogan (2009) has two main short-
comings. First, it has not yet addressed some recent experimental
ﬁndings such as the possible interaction of mirror and affordance
processes during action observation (see Bach et al., 2011). Second,
the work has only proposed an outline lacking details of how the
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odel can be computationally implemented. However, the model
dea is developed with a robotic implementation in mind and there-
ore presents suggestions on how to deal with some of the issues
ncountered in designing a model of mirror neurons and affor-
ances processing embedded in a robotic body.
.3. Relations between the technological and scientiﬁc models
It  is clear, as stated above, that scientiﬁc and technological mod-
ls of affordance processing have fundamentally different aims.
hile the former try to further elucidate the mechanisms under-
ying affordance processing in the human brain, the latter are
oncerned with providing artiﬁcial agents with improved function-
lity. Although this creates difﬁculties in establishing a “dialogue”
etween the two types of models and the scientiﬁc communi-
ies that develop them, there is potential for mutual improvement
etween the two approaches.
Scientiﬁc  models, for example, tend to exist at best in simu-
ation or as computational or mathematical implementations, or
end to perform strong abstractions and simpliﬁcations at the sen-
ory and motor level. While powerful from a theoretical point of
iew, such implementations cannot capture the complexities faced
y real organisms in the real world. These complexities however
ight require a certain brain structure that would be difﬁcult to
apture after the aforementioned simpliﬁcations.
Technological affordance models, on the other hand, tend to
ocus on typical engineering tasks that may  miss some of the more
nteresting challenges encountered by real organisms, for example
he problem of selecting affordances and actions based on multiple
igh level “needs” and goals, or the problem of understanding the
ntentions of the users or other robots. In this context, TRoPICALS
or instance illustrates how scientiﬁc models might complement
echnological ones by providing a comprehensive mechanism to
eal with issues arising from competing affordances.
.4. Models of the mirror (neuron) system
.4.1. The Oztop taxonomy
Oztop  et al. (2006) presented a comprehensive, computationally
nformed review of mirror system models. Rather than duplicating
his review, we highlight some of its major conclusions and focus
n data-driven models of mirror-neuron systems. One of the main
ontributions of Oztop et al. (2006) is a taxonomy of mirror neuron
odels based on their underlying methodologies (Fig. 5), classify-
ng models into four categories, of which the “data driven” category
s the most important one for the present paper.4
Data-driven models are relevant for researchers interested in
nderstanding brain and behaviour as they attempt to generate
ew accounts of the mirror neuron system and new empirical pre-
ictions, for instance on their possible functions. The main model
n this category at the time of the Oztop et al. (2006) review was
he Mirror Neuron System model (MNS model, Oztop and Arbib,
4 The other categories are: “reason for existence”, “assume existence” and “evo-
utionary  algorithm”. Models in the “reason for existence” category determine a
unctional role of the mirror system from other assumptions incorporated in the
odels (e.g., Tani et al., 2004; Haruno et al., 2001). Models of the “assume exist-
nce”  category simply assume the existence of the mirror neuron system and use
t to implement higher level functions (e.g., the ability to imitate, see for instance
emiris  and Johnson, 2003). Models from both categories are based on robotic or
imulated models and generate or assume capabilities related to mirror neurons
imilar to those observed in real organisms. The “evolutionary algorithm” category
ncludes  models that are evolved to produce mechanisms and behaviours that can be
elated to mirror neurons (e.g., Borenstein and Ruppin, 2005). The general reasoning
ehind  these models is that the emergence of a mirror neuron system supports the
dea that the functions implemented by such system strongly enhance the biological
tness of organisms.ioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 507
2002). Since then, however, the MNS2 I and II models (Bonaiuto
et al., 2007; Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010), a “chain model” on action
sequences (e.g., Chersi et al., 2006, 2011) and a model focussing on
the formation of mirror neuron-based goal representations in PC
(Thill and Ziemke, 2010; Thill et al., 2011) have been proposed. We
now focus on these data-driven models as they are most relevant
for this work, in particular in relation to the second principle (mir-
ror neurons representing action goals) and to build the integrated
model proposed in Section 4.
3.4.2. The MNS  model
The  MNS  model (Oztop and Arbib, 2002) is a seminal model that
extends FARS through the addition of brain areas supporting mir-
ror neurons within F5 (Fig. 6). The whole system architecture is
formed by three sub-systems (called “grand schemas” in the orig-
inal paper). The ﬁrst is based on a non-neural abstraction of FARS
functionalities for grasping (pivoting on the AIP-F5 canonical inter-
play) and extended with the functionalities for controlling reaching
(ascribed to the dorsal neural route (MIP/LIP/VIP)-F4-M1). The sec-
ond sub-system computes the hand-state based on a visual analysis.
This is a key concept of the model and includes both pure hand con-
ﬁguration parameters (e.g., hand aperture and hand velocity) and
parameters relating the hand to the object to be grasped (e.g., hand-
object distance, angle between hand and object axes). This visual
processing involves the associative visual area STS, responsible for
biological motion recognition as well as parietal areas 7a (encoding
the hand state) and 7b (important for integrating the information
on the hand state received from 7a). The visual processing also
involves information on object affordances (received from AIP). The
third and most important sub-system is formed by the F5 mirror
neurons and the connections they receive from area 7b. Interest-
ingly, the ventral stream (including the ITC-AIP connection present
in FARS) is completely left out of the model.
The sub-system subserving grasping (equivalent to FARS reach-
ing functions) and reaching functions (abstracted in FARS) is
implemented in MNS  using a non-neural “grasp simulator” that
generates and executes the trajectory of the arm-hand system
based on the positions of the object, arm and hand to perform a
suitable reach-grasp. This simulator solves the inverse kinematics
problem (generating motor commands based on a desired grasp)
based on a noisy gradient-descent mechanism. The subsystem com-
puting the hand state is based on image processing techniques for
colour segmentation and feature extraction that allow inferring the
positions of hand-ﬁnger segments and ﬁnding the best matching
posture-model for them. The mirror sub-system is implemented
with a standard error-back propagation neural network trained
to map  the “hand state-object affordance” input (encoded in area
7b) onto the performed action output (encoded in area F5 mirror)
based on the teaching signal (received from F5 canonical). The
MNS model can operate in two modes: “prehension mode” and
“action recognition mode”. In prehension mode, the system per-
forms actions (and trains the mirror system) based on the AIP-F5
and MIP/LIP/VIP-F4 circuits. In action recognition mode, the sys-
tem observes a hand moving towards an object. The cIPS-F5 circuit
still extracts and processes the affordances of perceived objects and
sends them to area 7b; simultaneously, STS processes the motion
and shape of the observed moving hand and again sends it to areas
7a and 7b. The 7b-F5 mirror system recognises the observed action
based on information received from AIP and STS.
The crucial feature of the MNS  model (apart from the introduc-
tion of the hand-state computation performed by the mirror system
discussed above) is the postulated relation between the canoni-
cal and the mirror systems. Speciﬁcally, the activation of canonical
neurons is used to train the mirror neurons: (a) to recognise the
visual appearance of the performed own  actions and (b) to cat-
egorise this visual appearance in terms of the representation of
508 S. Thill et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
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he related motor commands. In this way, the model allows the
eproduction of various empirical ﬁndings and the generation of
 number of neurophysiological predictions (see Oztop and Arbib,
002). One example of such a prediction is that mirror neurons
ften activate in anticipation of the achievement of the outcome of
he observed actions.
.4.3.  The MNS2-I model
The  MNS2-I model (Bonaiuto et al., 2007; Fig. 7) is an enhanced
ersion of the MNS  model. It reproduces two additional key ﬁnd-
ngs related to mirror neurons: (a) mirror neurons may  ﬁre not just
hen an action is observed but also when a sound associated with
hat action is heard (Kohler et al., 2002) and (b) mirror neurons ﬁre
uring the execution of the last part of the observed action even
f in this phase the observed hand or the object are hidden from
Fig. 6. Architecture of the MNS  model. Reproduced from Ozed from Oztop et al. (2006) with permission from Elsevier.
view  of the monkey (Umiltà et al., 2001). To account for these two
additional functionalities, the system has been augmented with:
(a) components to perform audio-processing (simulating the pro-
cesses taking place in auditory cortex), connected to the mirror
neurons and (b) components related to PFC and area 46, connected
to areas 7a and 7b to implement working memory (which encodes
information needed to drive the mirror-neuron system when the
hand/object are hidden).
Computationally, the ﬁrst extension (to process auditory infor-
mation) is based on a recurrent neural network trained with back
propagation through time (BPTT; Werbos, 1990) to associate some
features extracted from the sound wave to sound categories related
to the various possible actions (e.g., power and precision grasps).
The output units of this network are then associated through Heb-
bian learning with the mirror neurons during action execution. The
top and Arbib (2002) with permission from Springer.
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outcomes of actions.
In  MNS2-II, mirror neurons accelerate the discovery of novel
potential uses of actions in novel contexts if their outcome, whileFig. 7. Architecture of the MNS2-I model. Reproduced
econd extension (simulating working memory) is based on a sec-
nd recurrent neural network, again trained with BPTT. The use of
PTT is a signiﬁcant improvement the original MNS, which used a
eavily pre-processed input to take into consideration the recent
ast of the observed movement sequence. MNS2-I can directly take
he current hand state and object affordance as input that can be
ntegrated over time. This allows the system to reproduce the tar-
et data related to mirror responses when the observed hand and
bject are hidden.
.4.4.  The MNS2-II model
Recently,  Bonaiuto and Arbib (2010) presented MNS2-II to study
ther aspects of mirror neurons (Fig. 8). Computationally, this
odel represents a departure from its MNS  and MNS2-I prede-
essors. First, the model does not consider the social aspects of
irror neurons but focuses on its function in monitoring the out-
omes of own  action execution. This is used to investigate how such
 mechanism could be used to discover how known actions can
e applied in novel ways if the environmental conditions change.
econd, the system is tested in an abstract non-embodied setup
2D environment with x–y target object and actuator states), so
ctions (e.g., reach, grasp, eat) are encoded with localist units and
he sensory input (object state, actuator state, objects-actuator spa-
ial relations, etc.) with neural population codes. Third, the FARS
unctions are now (neutrally) implemented using an actor-critic
einforcement learning model (actor-critic RL; Sutton and Barto,
998) which learns to select actions by trial-and-error based on a
food” reward. This is crucial as it introduces trial-and-error learn-
ng as an important learning process compared to the supervised
earning algorithms used in previous models.
The mirror system is implemented, as in MNS, using a feed-
orward neural network trained with back propagation but its
utput is used as input to the “critic” of the model (motivated
y the assumption that actions recognised by the mirror neurons
ndicate a successful achievement of an action outcome that brings
he system closer to the ﬁnal high-level goal, thus serving as a
iable basis to evaluate the current situation). The connectionsBonaiuto et al. (2007) with permission from Springer.
entering  the actor (i.e., the connections between the hand state-
object affordance and the actor neurons representing the actions)
represent the executability of actions in the current sensed state.
These connections are increased when there is a match (a pseudo-
reinforcement) between the action selected by the actor and the
mirror unit recognising the intended effect (i.e., the goal) of the
same action and decreased otherwise. The system is thus capable
of evaluating if an action can be executed with success in a given
context based on mirror neurons encoding the expected outcomes
following the execution of a certain action.
The model also incorporates a second important concept: the
desirability of actions. The system possesses internal motivational
state units (only one in this implementation: “hunger”) that project
to the action units of the actor. The weights of these connections
encode the desirability of actions given a particular internal state
of the system. The desirability of one action is updated if the cor-
responding mirror neuron activates, even when it was  not the
intended action. This event signals that the achieved ﬁnal state
stood in an appropriate relation to the initial state fed to the mir-
ror system. The desirability of an action is updated by increasing
or decreasing it in proportion to the (signed) TD error of the RL
algorithm.5 The key idea here is that if the system has a certain
internal homoeostatic need (e.g., “being hungry”) and executes an
action successfully retained by the mirror system (successful in that
it achieves its goal), this action becomes desirable if it also leads the
system closer to the satisfaction of the homoeostatic need. In this
respect, desirability allows the model to capture the fact that high-
level goals are related to the adaptive value of the overall course
of action and not only to the “perceptual/cognitive” aspects of the5 The discounted properties of TD learning assure that the desirability of actions
in  a given internal states are higher for actions closer to the ﬁnal high-level goal
(Sutton  and Barto, 1998).
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brain area can develop to represent different aspects relevant for
behaviour, from perception to high-level goals.Fig. 8. Architecture of the MNS2-II model. Reproduced fr
aused by other actions, is recognised as useful in the new context.
his is one of the ﬁrst models where (a) mirror neurons are used to
onitor action outcomes, (b) high-level goals related to homoeo-
tatic regulations are introduced and related to action-goals and
c) a realistic trial-and-error procedure for associating actions to
ffordances is exploited.
.4.5.  The model of Metta et al. (2006)
Metta et al. (2006) present a model in which mirror-like rep-
esentations as observed in brain area F5 develop simply from the
nteraction of an agent with its environment. The overall function-
ng of the model is very similar to that of the MNS  models, so we
nly review it brieﬂy. The model was tested within a robotic imple-
entation to explore the automatic acquisition of affordances: this
as done based on the approach of Fitzpatrick et al. (2003) previ-
usly discussed. The core idea explored in the model is that mirror
eurons can emerge based on learning processes taking place while
he agent is autonomously interacting with the environment. In
articular, the system can observe the effects of its own  actions in
he world while it acts (as can the MNS  models). This information
eaches the mirror neurons, which can (if activated by canonical
eurons) develop the capacity to respond to the observation of
ctions even when other agents execute these.
.4.6. Models of mirror neurons as goal representations
A number of models are concerned with neurophysiological
esults such as those reported by Fogassi et al. (2005). These
odels address how mirror neurons represent both (low-level)
ction goals and high-level goals. As previously discussed, Fogassi
t al. (2005) found that some mirror neurons in the inferior pari-
tal lobe (IPL) tend to encode both speciﬁc motor primitives (e.g.,
reach”, “grasp”, “bring to mouth”) and the overall (high-level)
oal of the action sequence to which the primitive belongs (e.g.,
eat”). The models typically at least assume that PC receives strong
fferent connections from PFC and play an important role in the
epresentation of high-level goals.Some models (e.g., Chersi et al., 2006, 2011) postulate that the
motor primitives” are encoded by separate pools of neurons that
an “chain” together into an overall action with a certain overall
oal. For example, eating a strawberry could involve a chain likenaiuto and Arbib (2010) with permission from Springer.
“reach  → grasp → bring-to-mouth” while putting an object into a
box could be a chain like “reach → grasp → place”. Even though
these two chains share two primitives (“reach” and “grasp”), the
neural pools encoding those remain entirely distinct in the model.
However, Fogassi et al. (2005) found that about one third of IPL
neurons encoding a given motor primitive ﬁre independently of
the goal of the action and are therefore not likely to be sensitive
to speciﬁc high-level goals. More recent models take this addi-
tional evidence into account (e.g., Chersi et al., 2010; Thill et al.,
2011). In these models, the neural pools encoding the same motor
primitive within different chains are no longer completely distinct
but overlap partially. Chersi et al. (2010) were able to show that
these updated chain models can explain apparently contradictory
ﬁndings related to motor grounding of language processing.6
Thill et al. (2011) present a model aimed at understanding the
conditions that inﬂuence the percentage of neurons that develop
to encode (or not) the overall high-level goals of action chains. This
model, which builds on initial work presented by Thill and Ziemke
(2010), is based on a SOM (Kohonen, 2003) whose input is an encod-
ing of observed or executed motor primitives and of the context in
which the motor primitive is executed. The model is then used to
investigate how different key parameters, putatively related to self-
organising processes in the cortex, might lead to the organisation
observed in IPL mirror neurons. The model succeeds in reprodu-
cing the target ﬁndings to a remarkable degree: nodes in the map
encoding the same motion primitive are shown to group together
and form pools (see also Thill and Ziemke, 2010); moreover some
nodes only react if the motion primitive is shown in a speciﬁc con-
text while others activate irrespective of it. It is also shown that the
percentage of goal-encoding nodes that emerges during learning
is simply regulated by geometric relationships existing between
the different inputs. The model thus also clariﬁes how a single6 Speciﬁcally, some studies in this domain found facilitating effects of irrelevant
affordances  on task execution while others found inhibitory effects (see Chersi et al.,
2010 for details).
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The model of Thill et al. (2011) can also predict the percent-
ge of goal speciﬁc neurons that will emerge in function of the
elationship between the units encoding motor primitive and
hose encoding context. In practical implementations, e.g., a robot
ndowed with a mirror system, this can be used to ﬁne-tune the
elations between the sensory inputs to reproduce, for instance, the
roportions found by Fogassi et al. (2005). At present, however, the
xact mechanisms that would provide the contextual input remain
o be identiﬁed since the model merely suggests that affordances
ay play an important role in this. Mechanisms from FARS and
RoPICALS might however be able to serve this purpose. It is also an
pen question how this model might learn complete motor primi-
ive chains (but see Thill et al., 2012 for initial work on an approach
hat combines this model with the sequence learning algorithm of
andamirskaya and Schöner, 2010).
.4.7. Relations between the MNS  models and the goal-related
odels
In  terms of the Oztop taxonomy, the MNS  models and the goal-
elated models are ﬁrmly data-driven as they take into account a
onsiderable amount of anatomical and/or physiological empirical
vidence. Furthermore, most of these models provide a develop-
ental account of mirror neuron formation during the lifetime of
he model. However, while MNS  models mainly focus on premo-
or mirror neurons, goal-related models focus mainly on parietal
irror neurons and their capacity to simultaneously represent
igh-level goals and perception. Various studies (e.g., Fogassi et al.,
005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2007; Bonini et al., 2010) have shown
hat premotor and parietal mirror neurons are related but have
ifferent properties. The two types of models are thus complemen-
ary and unifying them in an integrated model may  help future
nvestigations of this relationship.
The  models also differ in the scope of the modelled systems
nd in the biological plausibility of their detailed implementation.
he MNS  models are system-level models which include all the
ecessary brain components that feed into the mirror neuron sys-
em (and that process affordances), but often use feed-forward or
ecurrent neural networks trained with a biologically non plausi-
le learning algorithm and other abstract engineering approaches
e.g., for visual processing). The goal-related models, on the other
and, are more focussed on speciﬁc areas and often do not explic-
tly include realistic sensory and motor modalities; however, they
odel some aspects of the mirror system more in detail and on this
asis succeed in replicating ﬁne physiological ﬁndings, in particular
hose reported by Fogassi et al. (2005).
. Integrating models of affordance control and mirror
eurons
This  section presents the design of an overall framework
ntegrating the different neuroscientiﬁc and psychological insights
eviewed in Section 2 as well as the computational principles
eviewed in Section 3. It is not the goal of this exercise to present
 speciﬁc model that could be directly implemented as such since
hat would be overly ambitious given the current state of the art.
ather, we aim at a theoretical framework serving two  distinct
urposes. First, it will allow the theoretical integration of the so far
argely disconnected knowledge reviewed in the previous sections.
econd, it should prove useful in guiding the construction of future
odels that study speciﬁc issues related to affordance control
nd mirror neurons. The section ﬁrst presents the framework
rchitecture and then discusses possible alternatives for imple-
enting some of its components based on speciﬁc computational
echanisms that depend on the speciﬁc research goals to be
ddressed. Finally, we discuss some examples of how one couldioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 511
address  some of the important questions currently debated in the
literature using the framework provided.
4.1. Framework architecture
Fig.  9 presents the framework architecture. The framework inte-
grates different aspects of the models reviewed in Section 3 into one
overall scheme. The previously reviewed models contribute to this
endeavour as follows:
• Affordance  and affordance control
◦ FARS (Fagg and Arbib, 1998): the role of parietal areas in form-
ing affordances.
◦ TRoPICALS (Caligiore et al., 2010): the top-down bias from PFC
and mechanisms for selecting affordances and actions; the role
of affective/sub-cortical brain components.
• Mirror  system
◦ MNS  models (Bonaiuto et al., 2007; Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010):
the main functionalities of the mirror system for action execu-
tion and understanding.
◦ Chain models (Chersi et al., 2006; Thill et al., 2011): the encod-
ing of goals by parietal mirror neurons; mechanisms for action
chaining and hierarchy.
This  list again illustrates that the different models are both dis-
tinct and complementary, which is also evident from the brain
areas and connectivity considered by the models. We can illustrate
this brieﬂy using aspects of MNS2 and TRoPICALS as an example:
both models include the visual cortex as well as PRR (MIP/LIP in
MNS2), AIP and IFC/PMC (F5 in MNS2). PRR has the same function-
ality in both models; its main role is the detection of the position
of objects. The function of AIP is object affordance extraction in
MNS2 and extraction of shape information for guiding manipula-
tion in TRoPICALS (which is a simpliﬁcation that stands as a proxy
for the various object properties encoded in the real AIP). TRoPI-
CALS and MNS2 also differ in the level of detail in premotor areas
modelling. Of the three areas considered (the ventral, lateral and
dorsal premotor cortex or areas F4, F5 and F2 respectively), only
PMCl (F5) is considered in both models. It is more detailed in MNS2,
where a distinction between canonical and mirror neurons is made.
The former are used to encode motor programs (for grasping; the
motor programs for reaching are stored in area F4) whereas the
latter are used in action recognition and form the main area of
interest in MNS2. TRoPICALS, on the other hand, makes the distinc-
tion between the lateral and dorsal premotor cortex (corresponding
to monkey areas F5 and F2 respectively), with the former encod-
ing planned ﬁnger postures and the latter encoding planned arm
postures.
In integrating insights from the different models, it is important
to remember that they are based to different degrees on monkey
and/or human data. MNS2 and FARS, for instance, refer to both
human and monkey brain regions while the goal-related models
are predominately based on monkey data and TRoPICALS mainly
addresses the human brain but assumes human-monkey homolo-
gies. Although it appears reasonable to assume the existence of such
homologies (see Arbib, 2006), this complicates the integration, for
example because it creates some confusion in the naming of areas
and in the attribution of functions to them.
The components of the framework implement the same func-
tions as in the models they originate from, so we only brieﬂy
mention them here and refer the reader to the previous sections
for details. First and foremost, the framework contains both ventral
and dorsal neural pathways. The ventral pathway involves visual,
temporal, and prefrontal cortex areas. PFC forms high-level goals
on the basis of two  types of information: the outer-world con-
text (based on information received from associative cortex such
512 S. Thill et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
Fig. 9. The architecture of the integrated framework, formed by the ventral neural pathway and the dorsal neural pathway, the latter including the mirror and canonical
neural circuits (dark and light grey boxes respectively). The dorsal pathway is divided in three neural routes for controlling eye, arm, and hand movements (incorporating
the affordance/canonical neuron system) and one additional neural route for the implementation of the mirror system. The ventral pathway includes PFC which controls
affordance selection (within PMC  and PC) based on the high-level goals of the individual that are in turn formed from external and internal context (e.g., the nature of the
s ns of 
a ystem
t somat
a
i
c
m
l
e
o
p
l
4
c
p
g
s
w
c
e
i
s
I
d
m
i
feen  object from VOT, task instructions from STC and internal homeostatic regulatio
nd  PEF within PC; PMCdl and IFC within PMC; and FEF within the PFC. The mirror s
hat related to movement, from STS within TC and proprioceptive information from 
s the temporal cortex) and the inner-world context (based on
nformation received from sub-cortical areas). The dorsal pathways
ontain three segregated neural routes for encoding sensorimotor
appings that “translate” affordances into actions: one for control-
ing reaching, one for controlling grasping, and one for controlling
ye movements. Although the latter route is not present in any
f the reviewed models, it reﬂects our belief that most cognitive
henomena cannot be fully understood without considering (at
east overt) attention (see Caligiore et al., 2010).
.1.1. Computational mechanisms to implement the framework
omponents
While  the selection of the framework components drawn from
revious models was quite straightforward (given the goal of inte-
rating the processes involving affordances control and the mirror
ystem), the selection of speciﬁc computational mechanisms with
hich the different components could be implemented is more
hallenging for at least two reasons: (a) the models (whether sci-
ntiﬁc or technological) allow for a number of different possible
mplementations and (b) the selection ultimately depends on the
peciﬁc scientiﬁc (or indeed technological) target of the research.
t is therefore more interesting to identify viable possibilities and
iscuss them with respect to different possible research goals than
erely providing unitary directions. Here, we discuss possible
mplementations of framework components by dividing them into
our groups:the system from Amg/Hyp). The affordance routes involve: cIPS within OC; PRR, AIP
 circuit involves areas 7a and 7b within PC (this get visual information, in particular
osensory areas not detailed for simplicity) as well as mirror areas within PMC (IFC).
(a) the affordance-action system involving circuits controlling eye
movements (SSC-PEF-FEF), reaching (SSC-PRR-PMCdl-M1), and
grasping (VC-cIPS-AIP-IFC-M1);
(b) the formation of high-level goals at the basis of top-down con-
trol  (VC-VOT/STC-PFC (Amg/Hyp));
(c) the mirror system (VC-STS-7ab-IFC) and its relation to the rep-
resentation  of action goals;
(d) the top-down control of the affordance and the mirror systems,
speciﬁcally the selection of affordances and actions as well as
the  modulation of mirror neurons.
4.1.2. Implementing the affordance-action system
Looking back at affordance models (see Section 3), it is appar-
ent that there are (at least) three paths that one can follow. If the
research focus is on the autonomous acquisition of affordances and
the capacity to use them to interact with the environment, then the
approach to follow is the one offered by the technological models
based on embodied systems equipped with realistic sensors and
actuators and efﬁcient learning algorithms (Section 3.2). Indeed,
in this case the emergent phenomena related to a rich and realis-
tic sensorimotor apparatus are required to study the target issue.
Moreover, the use of autonomous learning mechanisms facilitates
the discovery/representation of ﬁne computational processes in
the development of affordances. For example, one might use the
approach of Cos-Aguilera et al. (2004; use a SOM to relate object
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nvariants to success or failure of actions) or that of Fitzpatrick et al.
2003; record effects produced by actions on objects to classify
bjects) to autonomously learn affordances of objects. Of course,
his may  eventually also use sophisticated image-processing tech-
iques (e.g., SIFTS, Fritz et al., 2006). Alternatively, one might use
ther techniques to more strongly exploit affordances in the pro-
uction of useful/novel motor behaviours, as done for instance by
toytchev (2005; relation between affordances and sequences of
ctions) and Dogar et al. (2007; exploitation of affordance-based
ctions to build more complex goal-directed behaviours).
If  the focus is not on autonomous affordance acquisition as such,
ut affordances are a means to study other aspects of interest, one
ould simply hard-wire the affordance extraction process to func-
ion with a relevant degree of detail. For example, FARS (Fagg and
rbib, 1998), MNS  (Oztop and Arbib, 2002), and MNS2-I (Bonaiuto
t al., 2007) use 3D geometrical computations to extract object
ffordances from objects to obtain sophisticated representations of
bjects or “hand-states” that in turn allow the study of how these
ffect selection and execution of affordances and actions within the
IP-F5 circuit.
Alternatively, if the focus is mainly on other processes work-
ng on/involving the affordance/action system, one may  want to
trongly abstract affordances, using for instance simple 2D pop-
lation code representations. This path was followed in MNS2-II
Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010) to study new putative functions of the
irror system in monitoring action execution and in determin-
ng executability/desirability of actions as well as in TRoPICALS
Caligiore et al., 2010) to study how the affordance/action system
nd the ventral neural pathway pivoting on PFC can produce the
arious types of compatibility effects studied by cognitive psychol-
gy experiments.
A  related yet slightly different issue concerns how actions are
ctually found and associated to affordances. Robotic models have
eveloped a variety of approaches and algorithms to deal with this
ssue (see Section 3.2), but those are not necessarily inspired by
iology. If biological plausibility is important, there are two main
hoices from the models reviewed above. One is Hebbian learn-
ng used together with some form of exploratory motor-babbling
used, for instance, in TRoPICALS) while the other is reinforcement
earning (used for instance in MNS2-II). The former currently repre-
ents the best way to capture associative learning processes taking
lace in cortical pathways (Doya, 2000) while the latter represents
he best way to mimic  these processes not in isolation but as sup-
orted by trial-and-error learning taking place within BG and, in
articular, the striatum (Houk et al., 1995; Barto et al., 1995).
The  last point also touches upon a fundamental issue which
ends to be neglected given the usual focus on the cortex within
he neuroscientiﬁc literature on affordances and mirror neurons
ut cannot be further expanded upon here. Associative and frontal
ortical areas do not work in isolation from sub-cortical struc-
ures; rather, these areas form partially segregated loops with
orresponding areas of BG (Alexander et al., 1986) and cerebel-
um (Middleton and Strick, 2000). These loops play a critical role in
he functioning and learning processes implemented by the related
ortical areas as each loop works as a complete system. This should
e kept in mind when designing implementations of the framework
nd is especially important for studies involving the autonomous
cquisition of actions based on affordances.
.1.3. Implementing the formation of high-level goals
The  reviewed models offer less diversity when implementing
he formation of high-level goals. This is mainly due to lesser
ttention (within the computational literature) on the selection of
ffordances and mirror neurons using top-down control exerted
y the ventral pathway onto the dorsal pathway (one could argue
hat this is also, at least partially, due to a bias from a focus onioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 513
cognitive  issues that do not necessarily emphasise mechanisms
related to affect and motivations).
The  simplest route one can follow is that of MNS2-II (Bonaiuto
and Arbib, 2010): a simple representation of internal states based
on localist units. A more sophisticated solution is that followed by
TRoPICALS (Caligiore et al., 2010): an implementation of PFC that
can “explode” all possible combinations of contexts and instruc-
tions/internal states (e.g., using a SOM) which might then assume
the role of high-level goals once suitably linked (e.g., using Hebbian
learning) to the affordance/action components of the framework.
One  can also take into account more sophisticated mechanisms
originally proposed outside the ﬁeld of research on affordances or
mirror neurons if these are better suited to one’s research goals.
While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to review those mod-
els in detail, we refer the interested reader to representative papers
where relevant. These can for instance be of interest if there is
a need to represent the “executive functions” of PFC in a biolog-
ically plausible way. For example, one might refer to the model of
Deco and Rolls (2003; see also a review in Caligiore et al., 2010)
to study how PFC biases affordances and actions selection using
complex “rules” of behaviour. A detailed implementation of the
“working memory” function of PFC could use mechanisms pro-
posed by O’Reilly and Frank (2006). If there is a need to implement
PFC role in goal-directed behaviour using the notions of reward and
value, one might refer to Daw et al. (2005) for a functional model
and to Mannella et al. (2010), for a bio-constrained architecture
(see Mirolli et al., 2010, for a review on the key role of Amg  in these
processes). Finally, one can capture key functional properties of PFC
by referring to more abstract yet computationally more powerful
and “principled” models developed within the Bayesian framework
(Friston, 2003, 2005; Botvinick and An, 2008).
4.1.4. Implementing the mirror system
The models reviewed in the previous sections offer different
ways of implementing the mirror system in general and its devel-
opment in particular. All MNS  models compute a hand-state (an
encoding of the state of the hand in relation to the target object) and
use supervised learning algorithms to train mirror neurons to asso-
ciate speciﬁc hand-states with speciﬁc types of grasps (encoded by
canonical neurons). This is a useful approach if there is no need
for online learning in the mirror system. Alternatively, one could
consider using a Hebbian learning process to associate affordance
representations with action representations (see for instance Metta
et al., 2006, whose system can “autonomously” develop a mirror
system structure through repeated interaction with objects).
An  alternative approach for capturing the essential functional
operation of the mirror system is to follow Friston (2003, 2005, see
Section 2.2.1.4) who  suggested the use of the principled mecha-
nisms of predictive coding and Bayesian inference. This can capture
the “backward” generation of expectations on percepts (e.g., related
to the observed action of another agent) based on their ultimate
causes (related to the intentions of the agent) as well as the “for-
ward” inference of the causes from percepts (e.g., the intention of
others from the perception of their actions).
4.1.5. Implementing top-down control of affordances/actions and
of the mirror system
To  decide which computational mechanisms can be used to
implement the effects of top-down control of affordances and
action execution pivoting on PFC, one has to distinguish between
the different ways in which such control can take place (see Section
2): bias of action selection (e.g., within the PMC), bias of affordance
selection (e.g., within PC), control of covert/overt attention (e.g.,
within ITC, PC and, via these, the lower visual areas).
Regarding the biasing effects, FARS, TRoPICALS, as well as the
goal-representation models, all use some types of competitive
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eural mechanisms to allow the selection of actions (FARS and
RoPICALS) or affordances (FARS and goal-related models; some of
he latter used an abstraction of the competition represented by a
inner-take-all or many-take-all competition). These mechanisms
re based on the encoding of affordances or actions with different
eventually overlapping) neural pools that have within-pool excita-
ory connections and between-pool inhibitory connections. Given
he biological plausibility of the general principle (cortical neurons
ave a typical locally excitatory/globally inhibitory connection pat-
ern, see Cisek, 2007), this would be the recommended approach.
Inhibitory  mechanisms should also be considered when imple-
enting affordance selection (Tipper et al., 1992; Ellis et al.,
007a, 2007b; Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2002). Indeed, adaptive
nd ﬂexible behaviour involves not only the positive bias of useful
ffordances and actions but also the active inhibition of affordances
nd actions elicited by cues and objects irrelevant for pursuing the
gent’s goals. Inhibition can be implemented abstractly through the
ddition of an inhibitory neural pathway connecting PFC to areas
here affordances and actions are elaborated (e.g., PC and PMC),
s done in Caligiore et al. (2013). Alternatively, the implementa-
ion can be based on a more detailed representation of inhibitory
echanisms involving BG (Munakata et al., 2011; Aron et al., 2003),
xploiting existing models (e.g., Houk et al., 1995; Gurney et al.,
001; Joel et al., 2002; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). Shepherd et al.
2009) and Mukamel et al. (2010) illustrate that inhibition may  also
e important for mirror neurons as these authors have shown that
ub-populations of mirror neurons are inhibited by the observa-
ion of the performed action. These neurons, and their inhibition,
ould play an important role, both in the prevention of undesired
vert action execution when observing other agents performing an
ction and in the selection of suitable actions to execute when mul-
iple actions are observed (e.g., in imitation tasks). Interestingly,
he speciﬁc neural mechanisms for implementing these functions
ight be the same as those considered above for the modulation
f affordances and executed actions.
With respect to covert attention, relevant models have been
roposed outside the affordance/mirror neuron literature (e.g., Itti
t al., 1998; Itti and Koch, 2000). Similarly, one can refer to a
umber of models within the literature of attention and active per-
eption to implement overt attention mechanisms (e.g., Ballard,
991; Ognibene et al., 2008). It is important to again underline
he signiﬁcant role that overt attention may  play in phenomena
elated to affordances (see, Kornblum et al., 1999; Tipper et al.,
006). Indeed, once an object is perceived, the brain has a strong
ias to elicit the internal representations encoding its affordances
nd this can affect all downstream processes (“out of sight, out of
 . . action”). Attention may  thus play a paramount role in control-
ing affordance-based behaviour, a role that cannot be ignored in
xplaining various empirical ﬁndings. It should be noted that we
o not intend to downplay or underestimate the importance of the
ontrol of affordances and action execution at later stages of the
orsal pathways (e.g., via the PFC-SMA-PMC route, see Section 2)
or overemphasise the automatic nature of affordances. We  simply
ould like to emphasise that attention remains a fundamental way
y which PFC can perform such control.
. Investigating speciﬁc problems and implementing
peciﬁc models with the framework
This section discusses some open issues related to the affor-
ance and mirror systems that might be investigated through the
mplementation of speciﬁc models based on parts of the framework
resented in Section 4. This discussion has two aims. First, it illus-
rates the framework’s potential for contributing to the theoretical
nvestigation of some of the most important open issues relatedioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
to  the affordance and mirror systems. Second, it provides indica-
tions on how to build speciﬁc models based on the framework to
address such problems in detail. These speciﬁc models are expected
to lead to the production of speciﬁc interpretations and predic-
tions. The discussion here will also highlight the complementarity
of the mechanisms underlying affordance learning and computa-
tion, affordance control and the representation of goals based on
mirror neurons, thereby highlighting the utility of the framework
in the integration of these concepts.
5.1. Canonical and mirror neurons
The ﬁrst open issue regards the relation between canonical and
mirror neurons. The functions of canonical and mirror neuron sys-
tems have each been intensely investigated separately using, for
instance, the models reviewed in Section 3. Few works consider
the relations between the two, although it is clear that signiﬁcant
relations do exist. Some models investigate how mirror neurons
emerge under the guidance of canonical neurons (e.g., Metta et al.,
2006). Other models investigate how mirror neurons might be used
for other functions, for example to monitor action outcomes to
improve the course of action (MNS2-II, Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010).
However, we still do not understand the principles underlying the
relations between the affordance and mirror systems. Consider, for
example, the neural processes taking place in the brain when an
action fails to achieve its intended desired outcome (Brown and
Braver, 2005; Matsumoto et al., 2007), or the question of how goals
can drive the learning of affordances and actions (the problem of
“goal-based action learning”; see Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). A
speciﬁc implementation of the components of the framework sup-
porting affordance and action selection as well as those related to
the mirror system would allow studying these issues. An example
would be the effects that a failure of action execution, detected from a
mismatch with its goal represented by mirror neurons, might have
on the current course of action as well as future action selection (see
Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010). The issue of goal-based action learning
could be studied by implementing: (a) a reinforcement learning
implementation for affordance learning; (b) the mirror system for
the encoding of goals of actions; (c) a motivational system to allow
the system to autonomously generate goals (e.g., based on intrinsic
motivations, see Redgrave and Gurney, 2006; Baldassarre, 2011). In
general, we  expect that such models will lead to the discovery of a
division of labour between the mirror and canonical systems, with
the former guiding learning and playing a prominent role in action
monitoring while the latter plays an important role in storing infor-
mation about the actual implementation of actions (see Bonaiuto
and Arbib, 2010).
5.2.  Goal representations at different levels of abstraction
Another issue concerns the relation between goal represen-
tations at different levels of abstraction. Investigating this issue
requires in particular a study of the effects caused by the top-down
control exerted by PFC on the mirror system at both the PMC/IFC
and PC levels. The critical questions here are: how do high-level
goals encoded in the PFC actually affect the mirror neuron acti-
vation observed in empirical experiments (Fogassi et al., 2005;
Hamilton and Grafton, 2007)? What is the precise adaptive func-
tion of this activation and what are the underlying mechanisms (see
Thill et al., 2011)? Note how these issues touch the fundamental
open problem on the exact structure and functioning of the hier-
archical organisation of motor behaviour stressed by many authors
(e.g., Fuster, 2008; Botvinick and An, 2008). An implementation
encompassing the mirror neuron system and the top-down affor-
dance/action control from the framework might help this investiga-
tion. It would, for example, allow the study of how high-level goals
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ight be accomplished based on actions differing in their proximal
oals (see the experiments of Hamilton and Grafton, 2007) or how
igh-level goals are formed from low-level ones. To the best of our
nowledge, no model currently investigates these issues in a bio-
ogically constrained fashion. The framework suggests that such
 model will show that the mirror and affordance systems tend
e hierarchically related, with the former having a stronger link to
igh-level goals (e.g., encoded in PFC). The affordance system would
e subordinated and more closely related to action implementation
see Fagg and Arbib, 1998; Caligiore et al., 2010).
.3. Affect and motivation
The  relevance of affect and motivation for high-level goals
s well as action goals relying on the mirror system is another
mportant issue that is not yet well understood but can be studied
sing the framework. As mentioned in Section 4, research on
ffordances and mirror neurons tends to overlook the importance
f affective and sub-cortical areas. The framework presented here
ighlights the role of affect and motivations (processed within
he sub-cortical areas at the interface between the brain and the
isceral body, such as Amg  and Hyp) as a fundamental source
f information for the formation of high-level goals within PFC
Fuster, 2008). Given the strong interdependence between the
igh-level goals in PFC and the action-goals within the mirror
ystem discussed previously, investigating these issues would
equire PFC, the mirror areas and, at a minimum, the effects of
ffective information from the visceral body on high-level goals
e.g., Mannella et al., 2010). This would facilitate the understanding
f how the homeostatic drives of an organism guide the formation
nd selection of high-level goals (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998),
ncluding the impact thereof on affective and motivational aspects
f action goals within the mirror system. Such a model would
herefore clarify how the affordance and mirror systems are
ffected by motivational aspects of behaviour and sub-cortical
reas of brain. This remains an important issue often neglected by
he current literature (Cheng et al., 2007).
.4. Functional roles of mirror neurons in higher-level cognition
An  important, often debated issue in mirror neuron research
oncerns their potential functional contributions to (higher-level)
ognitive phenomena. Although the literature is swamped with
ypotheses regarding the possible roles of these neurons in high-
evel cognition – action understanding being the prime example
see Rizzolatti and Singaglia, 2010, for a review) – very few of these
ave actually been veriﬁed (see Hickok, 2008, for a discussion).
ost mirror neuron models cannot contribute much to the debate
ecause they do not model how mirror neurons actively contribute
o action understanding in a way that would not otherwise be possi-
le. In this respect, it has been shown that the organisation of mirror
eurons itself, including goal-speciﬁc (parietal) neurons as found
y Fogassi et al. (2005), can emerge in models that do not explicitly
onsider action understanding at all (Thill et al., 2011). Build-
ng system-level models within the framework proposed here is
xpected to give indications of why the speciﬁc functioning of mir-
or neurons is very well suited/economical within an overall system
hat has to accomplish multiple functions (Kilner et al., 2007).
.5.  Merging cortical and sub-cortical mechanisms
It is possible to study the processes of selecting and learning of
ffordances and actions within PC and PMC  including the support
iven by sub-cortical structures using the framework presented
ere. It is becoming increasingly clear that these processes may
lay a crucial role in the explanation of various phenomena relatedioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 515
to  affordances and mirror neurons to date typically studied with a
focus on the cortex in cognitive psychology or neuroscience (see
for instance MNS2-II and TRoPICALS).
As mentioned in Section 4, BG play a key role in these processes
(Houk et al., 1995). Yet there are, to our knowledge, no biologically
constrained models that explicitly simulate relevant functions of
BG in the literature on affordances or on mirror neurons. Nonethe-
less, research and modelling related to BG, habits acquisition, and
goal-directed behaviour pivoting on PFC has produced several mod-
els (e.g., Gurney et al., 2001; Baldassarre, 2002; Joel et al., 2002;
O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). The integrated framework proposed here
provides an important starting point for merging the two types
of models (“cortical” and “subcortical”) since it emphasises sub-
cortical mechanisms leading to the formation of high-level goals
and provides a comprehensive representation of the cortical neu-
ral pathways. Building such a model would also help clarify the
different properties of inhibitory mechanisms through which PFC
exerts its top-down control via cortical excitation and sub-cortical
inhibition (Munakata et al., 2011).
5.6. Automatic activation of affordances
Work on the automatic activation of affordances would also
greatly beneﬁt from models considering the affordance-action sys-
tem not just by itself but in function of the top-down control exerted
on it by the ventral pathway. Whether affordances are elicited auto-
matically or modulated by the agent’s goals (Tucker and Ellis, 1998,
2001; Tipper et al., 2006) remains an active topic of research. Recent
behavioural evidence from tasks requiring a detailed processing
of shapes compared to superﬁcial judgements on colour has for
example shown that the activation of affordances is modulated by
the degree of object processing (e.g., Pellicano et al., 2010; Tipper
et al., 2006). Other studies indicate that the activation of affor-
dances is modulated by spatial context; it is for example stronger
when objects can easily be reached compared to when they are in
extrapersonal space (Costantini et al., 2010; Ambrosini et al., 2012).
Costantini et al. (2011) demonstrated that affordances are also acti-
vated when objects are located in the peripersonal space of another
person (e.g., an avatar) but not when they are in the peripersonal
space of an inanimate cylinder, which suggests that affordance
activation, the mirror mechanisms, and the high-level goal system
of the agent are all involved. Models such as TRoPICALS demon-
strate that addressing these issues requires including not only the
dorsal neural pathway (to implement affordances and actions),
but also the ventral pathway (to form the agent’s high-level goals
and modulate the selection of affordances and actions). As seen in
the reviews earlier, research on these topics produces a wealth of
information that could greatly beneﬁt from integrated modelling
such as outlined by the framework here. The models thus produced
are likely to lead to the identiﬁcation of general mechanisms and
principles possibly linking a number of phenomena that are cur-
rently often studied separately (such as selective attention, Simon
effects, compatibility effects, and stable/variable affordances).
5.7.  Stable and variable affordances
The  framework also has the potential to facilitate further
investigations within the theory on stable and variable affordances
(Borghi and Riggio, 2009). Compared to variable affordances (e.g.,
object position), representations of stable affordances are likely to
involve the more ventral neural routes of the dorsal pathway (e.g.,
to encode the common size of a certain class of objects), or even
the ventral pathway (for instance where stable aspects related to
object recognition in temporal areas or the object’s common use
and function are concerned, see Creem-Regehr and Lee, 2005). Such
issues could be investigated with models encompassing some of
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he dorsal routes and the ventral route involving temporal and pre-
rontal cortex from the framework. The location of stable/variables
ffordances within the ventral/dorsal pathways (or within the
ifferent dorsal neural routes) remains a topic of debate (see
ection 2.1.1.2). Different hypotheses on this matter could result in
ifferent predictions from the integrated framework allowing their
alidation using empirical tests. The relations existing between
table/variable affordances and the brain systems underlying them,
uch as the different cortical streams within the dorsal neural
athway (Sakreida et al., submitted), could be clariﬁed in this way.
.8. The emergence of communication
It  would also be possible to address the possible emergence
f human verbal communication from gestural communication.
ccording to Ferrari et al. (2003), a sub-population of F5 dis-
harges when observing and executing mouth gestures like biting,
rasping or ingesting. Additional neurons discharge when execut-
ng/observing communicative facial gestures, such as lip-smacking.
hese results suggest that area F5 may  also be involved in gestural
ommunication (see also Gentilucci and Corballis, 2006; Gentilucci
nd Dalla Volta, 2008, for reviews). Models derived from the
ramework and including mirror neurons and the areas forming
igh-level goals can be used to investigate these theories further.
hese models could exploit the associative mechanisms used in
aligiore et al. (2010) to represent the meaning of words in terms
f internal representations of objects and actions (e.g., to represent
erbs and nouns), and link these representations ﬁrst to gestural
ctions and then to the production of linguistic utterances (e.g.,
gain with associative mechanisms, for example as those used in
irolli and Parisi, 2005).
.9.  Implementing theories from cognitive psychology
The framework can also be used to create operational imple-
entations of the core hypotheses proposed by important
ognitive psychology theories such as the ideomotor principle
Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Kiesel and Hoffmann, 2004), the com-
on coding theory (Prinz, 1990) and the event coding theory
Hommel et al., 2001). One core idea of these theories is that
ate-sensory/early-motor representations are intrinsically related
o goals in addition to being strongly grounded in the sensorimo-
or brain. Since the framework presented here includes both action
oals (within the mirror neurons) and high-level goals (encoded in
FC), it can help in the reproduction of results from psychological
xperiments on these theories and in relating them to speciﬁc brain
echanisms, similar to the approach of Caligiore et al. (2010). This
spect of research in cognitive psychology stands to greatly ben-
ﬁt from interdisciplinary approaches, such as advocated by the
resent framework, and thus link behavioural phenomena (e.g.,
he ideomotor principle) to the underlying brain mechanisms (e.g.,
irror neurons) with the aid of computational models.
.10.  Mirror neurons and the predictive coding theory
Bayesian/predictive coding approaches (Friston, 2005; Kilner
t al., 2007) tend to produce models with powerful computational
apabilities that capture key principles working at the heart of
ortical information processing, yet at the same time often remain
nly weakly constrained by biology in terms of the overall archi-
ecture of the system. The framework presented could contribute
n this aspect by facilitating the design of a suitable, biologically
onstrained macro-architecture of models whose components
ould then be implemented in Bayesian terms. Such an approach
s for example becoming increasingly important for Dynamic
ausal Modelling, a type of modelling technique developed withinioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521
the  Bayesian framework and used to account for brain data, in
particular from brain imaging (Stephan et al., 2007; Friston, 2009).
In this approach, Bayesian statistics are used to compare the
quality of competing models (i.e., the likelihood with which they
produce the data) and to tune their parameters on the basis of
brain data. The construction of these models has to be guided by
functional considerations (“what role does this area play within the
functioning of the system as a whole?”) and brain-anatomy con-
straints expressed at the system-level. The framework presented
here provides appropriate constraints than can be used to design
models within this approach and used to study phenomena related
to affordance and mirror systems. The translation of parts of the
framework into speciﬁc Dynamic Causal Models should directly
produce predictions testable against biological data, in particular
from brain imaging studies (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
6.  Conclusions
The ﬁrst goal of this paper has been to provide a comprehen-
sive and integrative review of the affordance and mirror neuron
systems, including work from psychology, neuroscience, and com-
putational modelling efforts. We  proposed that a ﬁrst unifying prin-
ciple underlying the brain organisation of motor behaviour is the
ability to select between multiple available affordances and actions.
We have shown that the ventral neural pathway of brain carries out
this function, involving in particular PFC, its input and output con-
nectivity and its speciﬁc information processing mechanisms. PFC
can use information from the outer context and the homeostatic
drives to form high-level goals. With this information, PFC can bias
the selection of affordances and actions and guide attention. This
biasing activity is based on various features of PFC, including its
capacity to integrate multiple sources of information, to implement
working memory, and to form complex behavioural “rules”.
A  second unifying principle underlying the brain organisation
of motor behaviour is the ability to represent goals of actions at
the mirror neuron level within both the parietal and the premotor
cortex. Mirror neurons have a number of properties that suggest
they may  be encoding action goals: they can activate indepen-
dently of action performance, they posses anticipatory features,
they receive information from brain areas suited to process seen
actions, and they respond not only to action goals but also to the
overall (high-level) goals of actions. These properties allow mir-
ror neurons to play important adaptive functions not only in social
contexts (for which they have become widely known) but also in
individual behaviour, for example for action monitoring.
The second goal of this paper has been to investigate possible
relationships between the affordance and mirror systems. Our
analysis of the psychological, neuroscientiﬁc, and computational
studies on these systems has detailed how the two systems might
be hierarchically related. We  have related the mirror system more
closely to the encoding of goals of behaviours represented at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction while the affordance system has been
related more to the planning and execution of actions. Moreover,
we have suggested that the mirror neuron system may  lead the
processes of learning suitable affordances and actions based on the
representations of desired outcomes (goals) while the affordance
system may  play a key role in the acquisition of new speciﬁc
sensorimotor mappings by which they can be implemented.
We  then presented an extensive review of key computational
models of affordance representation learning and action execution,
of affordance control, and of the mirror neuron system. Here, our
aim has been to leverage this knowledge with that gained from the
reviews in the previous sections. This has allowed us to propose an
integrated framework developed with two main aspects in mind:
(a) its macro-architecture, encompassing all brain areas relevant
behavioral Reviews 37 (2013) 491–521 517
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Table 1 (Continued)
PIP Posterior intraparietal area
PMC  PMC premotor cortex
PMCdl (F2, F4) Premotor cortex, dorsolateral region
PRR (MIP) Parietal  reach region (medial intraparietal cortex)
SC Superior colliculus
SI Primary somatosensory area
SII  Secondary somatosensory area
SMA  Supplementary motor area
SMC  (F6) Supplementary motor cortex
STC Superior  temporal cortex
STS Superior  temporal sulcus
TC Temporal  cortex
VC Visual cortexS. Thill et al. / Neuroscience and Bio
or the implementation of the affordance and mirror systems and
b) the speciﬁc computational approaches that might be used to
mplement speciﬁc models of these areas. Given its scope, the
ramework is rather ambitious and complex and a complete imple-
entation thereof would be difﬁcult. Its main utility rather lies in
he theoretical framework that it can provide for building speciﬁc
odels aimed at investigating speciﬁc issues related to affordance
nd mirror systems. To support the viability of this idea, we have
iven various indications on how parts of the framework could be
mplemented to investigate speciﬁc open research questions.
Speciﬁc  models that might derive from the integrated frame-
ork presented here could also be highly relevant to technological
pplications in addition to their potential for furthering scientiﬁc
nderstanding. Indeed, much work in bio-inspired and cognitive
obotics takes inspiration from biology to build machines endowed
ith life-like cognitive abilities. The affordance and the mirror sys-
em are surely key building blocks of the most sophisticated natural
ntelligent systems and hence might serve as a basis from which to
evelop architectures and algorithmic principles within artiﬁcial
ognitive systems (see Oztop et al., 2006; Montesano et al., 2008).
Arbib (2010) has recently argued that models which focus only
n a speciﬁc subsystem of the brain cannot fully address the chal-
enges of cognitive neuroscience and that progress in the simulation
f adaptive behaviour requires “a balancing act between large scale
odels and focussed research” (p. 9). We  believe that speciﬁc
mplementations of parts of the integrated framework proposed
ere would be a suitable approach towards such a balancing act.
ndeed, the framework offers a broad system-level perspective on
ffordance/prefrontal/mirror systems while simultaneously guid-
ng the construction of speciﬁc models focussed on and tailored to
peciﬁc problems.
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able 1
cronyms of the brain regions used in the article. Cortical areas of monkeys that are
omologues to human cortical areas are indicated in parentheses.
AIP Anterior intraparietal area
Amg  Amygdala
BG Basal ganglia
cIPS Caudal portion of the intraparietal cortex
FEF Frontal eye ﬁeld
Hip  Hippocampus
Hyp Hypothalamus
IFC (F5) Inferior frontal cortex
IPC Inferior  parietal cortex
M1  Primary motor cortex
OFC  Orbital frontal cortex
PC  Parietal cortex
PEF (LIP) Parietal eye ﬁeld (lateral intraparietal area)
PFC Prefrontal cortex
PFCdl Prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral region
PFCo Prefrontal cortex, orbital region
PFCvm Prefrontal  cortex, ventromedial regionVIP Ventral intraparietal area
VOT  (ITC) Ventral occipitotemporal cortex (inferior temporal cortex)
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